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FROM OVERDOSE TO CRIME SCENE: THE
INCOMPATIBILITY OF DRUG-INDUCED
HOMICIDE STATUTES WITH DUE PROCESS
KAITLIN S. PHILLIPS†
ABSTRACT
As the opioid epidemic ravages the United States, federal and state
legislators continue to seek various ways to mitigate the crisis. Though
public health advocates have successfully pushed for harm-reduction
initiatives, a contrasting punitive response has emerged. Across the
country, prosecutors and legislators are turning to drug-induced
homicide (“DIH”) statutes as a law-and-order response to the crisis.
DIH statutes, which can carry sentences as severe as life in prison,
impose criminal liability on anyone who provided drugs that led to a
fatal overdose. Though DIH laws are often justified as tools to target
large-scale drug distributors, in reality, they more often target friends
or family of the deceased. Troublingly, despite the foundational
criminal law principle that intent is required to impose culpability, DIH
laws are strict liability offenses, requiring no intent toward the resulting
death.
Examining the development of strict liability offenses in the
American legal system, this Note asserts that criminal intent—mens
rea—is an indispensable due process protection in homicide law. It
argues that DIH laws, though not facially unconstitutional, are
functionally anti-constitutional—inconsistent with the spirit, if not the
letter, of due process. This Note is the first to reconcile DIH statutes
with the broader context of strict liability criminal jurisprudence,
contending that these laws impose punishment far in excess of the
culpability they require. Accordingly, it calls upon state legislatures to
repeal or amend these laws, offering various frameworks to better align
DIH statutes with the protections required for criminal defendants.
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“[A]s a vitious will without a vitious act is no civil crime, so, on the
other hand, an unwarrantable act without a vitious will is no crime at
all.”
William Blackstone1
“It used to be that cops would get called to a hotel and find someone
with a needle in their arm and they would often go, ‘Well, that’s a real
tragedy,’ and bag him up . . . . It’s been part of my job to convince them
it’s not over . . . . The way I see i[t], if you kill one of my kids, you owe
me for one dead kid and I want to collect.”
Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, MN2

INTRODUCTION
In July 2013, Jarret McCasland, twenty-four years old,
accompanied his nineteen-year-old girlfriend, Flavia Cardenas, while
she purchased heroin from a dealer outside Baton Rouge, Louisiana.3
Flavia paid for the drugs and asked Jarret to carry them in his pocket
on their return home.4 The pair had a history of drug abuse; they were
arrested together on possession charges earlier that year, and Flavia
had once been hospitalized for an overdose before ever meeting
Jarret.5 That evening in July, they both used heroin and, at Flavia’s
request, Jarret injected her with cocaine.6 The next morning, Flavia was
1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 21 (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 4th ed. 1770).
2. Sarah Horner, Metro Prosecutors Ramp Up Pursuit of Drug Dealers in Overdose Cases,
PIONEER PRESS (Oct. 25, 2017, 9:55 AM), https://www.twincities.com/2017/10/25/twin-citiesmetro-prosecutors-ramp-up-pursuit-of-drug-dealers-in-overdose-cases [https://perma.cc/R7JDWEL2].
3. See Jamie Peck, Why Heroin Addicts Are Being Charged with Murder, ROLLING STONE
(Aug. 2, 2018, 12:36 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/heroin-opioidaddicts-charged-with-murder-o-d-703242 [https://perma.cc/P9GW-5GTL] (stating the couple
“habitually used drugs together in their town outside of Baton Rouge” and describing their
movements on the night in question).
4. LINDSAY LASALLE, DRUG POL’Y ALL., AN OVERDOSE DEATH IS NOT MURDER: WHY
DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE LAWS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND INHUMANE 35 (2017),
http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/dpa_drug_induced_homicide_report_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YRG5-3ZH8].
5. Joe Gyan Jr., Jury Convicts Denhan Springs Man of Murder, Was Accused of Injecting
Girlfriend with Heroin Before Her Death, ADVOCATE (Apr. 30, 2019, 2:55 PM), https://
www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_f28cf6b4-d4ad-5a4e-bf11-a57dd04866aa.html
[https://perma.cc/YS2T-UN9S].
6. See LASALLE, supra note 4, at 35; Jessica Pishko, When Using Heroin with a Friend Gets
You Charged with Murder, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/crimejustice/2017/12/using-heroin-gets-you-charged-with-murder [https://perma.cc/KP6T-6WYH]. At
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dead.7 Shortly thereafter, Jarret was arrested by the Baton Rouge
police and charged with her murder.8
At trial, state pathologists testified that Flavia died of respiratory
failure induced by a heroin overdose.9 Expert testimony produced by
the defense claimed that Flavia died from a multi-drug combination,
stating that her body “was a soup of very dangerous drugs.”10 Despite
conflicting testimony regarding the exact time of death, cause of death,
and who purchased or administered which drugs, Jarret was found
guilty of second-degree murder.11 The judge handed down the
mandatory sentence—noting that its severity “bother[ed him]
tremendously”—and Jarret, a then twenty-seven-year-old addict,
received life in prison without parole.12
Jarret was convicted under a Louisiana drug-induced homicide
(“DIH”) statute imposing criminal liability on anyone who “unlawfully
distributes or dispenses a controlled dangerous substance . . . which is
the direct cause of the death of the recipient who ingested” the
substance.13 Louisiana is not the only state with a specific offense
treating deaths resulting from the delivery of certain drugs as
homicides.14 As of January 2019, twenty-five jurisdictions have enacted
DIH statutes.15 Penalties for these offenses vary, though the majority
of them impose sentences of at least ten years.16 In six jurisdictions, the
trial, Jarret denied giving Flavia anything besides cocaine, testifying that he watched her buy the
heroin and inject herself with it. Id. However, Flavia’s friend testified that Jarret also injected
Flavia with heroin. Gyan, supra note 5.
7. Gyan, supra note 5.
8. Peck, supra note 3.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Joe Gyan Jr., Judge Refuses To Alter Life Sentence for Denham Springs Man in
Girlfriend’s Alleged Heroin Death, ADVOCATE (June 17, 2019, 4:21 PM), https://www.
theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_01619b17-92ec-52b3-a998-f22430e3f9fc.html [https://
perma.cc/5LPK-7M3D].
13. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(3) (2016). The shorthand “DIH” is not commonly used in
previous academic literature regarding this topic. This Note borrows the acronym from
Northeastern University School of Law’s Health in Justice Action Lab. E.g., Drug-Induced
Homicide, HEALTH JUST. ACTION LAB, https://www.healthinjustice.org/drug-induced-homicide
[https://perma.cc/M2KD-KSVY].
14. See Drug Induced Homicide Laws, PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE POL’Y SYS. (2019),
http://www.pdaps.org/datasets/drug-induced-homicide-1529945480-1549313265-1559075032
[https://perma.cc/PCA4-SAGJ] (compiling DIH statutes throughout the United States that are
valid at least through January 1, 2019).
15. Id.
16. Id. (follow “3.1. What is the minimum incarceration period?” hyperlink).
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minimum penalty is life in prison.17 In two jurisdictions, the maximum
penalty is death.18
Louisiana’s statute was enacted in 1987 as part of a nationwide
trend at the height of the Reagan administration’s “war on drugs.”19
After a high-profile celebrity overdose death in 1986,20 public outcry
led to multiple jurisdictions enacting harsh laws to prosecute those who
sold drugs that led to accidental overdoses.21 Despite the prevalence of
17. Id.
18. Id. (follow “4.1. What is the maximum incarceration period?” hyperlink). The two states
that offer a death penalty for DIH crimes are Florida and Oklahoma. Id. Colorado’s DIH law
previously had the potential to be a capital offense, id., but the state repealed the death penalty
in March 2020, Act of Mar. 23, 2020, ch. 61, 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 204. To date, it appears that no
one convicted under a DIH statute has received the death penalty. The Author determined this
by reviewing death row information for the states listed above. This search was limited to actual
convictions, and as such would not reveal any situations where the prosecution sought a death
penalty charge but did not obtain it.
Florida’s DIH statute was enacted in 1972, LASALLE, supra note 4, at 57, and there have
been no capital convictions under this statute since, see Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/execution-database [https://perma.cc/MKB4R8N7] (listing ninety-nine executions since 1972); Death Row Roster, FLA. DEP’T CORR., http://
www.dc.state.fl.us/OffenderSearch/deathrowroster.aspx [https://perma.cc/7WVJ-Q98F] (listing
339 inmates on Florida’s death row). Individual Google searches for each inmate either executed
or on death row revealed that none were convicted of DIH (database of search results on file with
the Duke Law Journal). Oklahoma’s DIH statute was enacted in 1996, LASALLE, supra note 4,
at 59, and there have been no capital convictions under this statute since, see Execution Database,
supra (listing 112 inmates executed since 1996); Inmates Sentenced to Death, OKLA. DEP’T CORR.,
http://doc.ok.gov/Websites/doc/images/DRMR%202-11-2020%20NAME_NUMBER.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/Z6HE-64JU] (listing forty-seven current death row inmates). Individual Google
searches for each inmate either executed or on death row revealed that none were convicted for
DIH (database of search results on file with the Duke Law Journal). Colorado’s DIH law was
enacted in 1990, LASALLE, supra note 4, at 56, and there were no capital convictions found for a
DIH offense in Colorado after that date, see MICHAEL L. RADELET, THE HISTORY OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN COLORADO 266–77 (2016) (listing all Colorado capital sentences from 1975
to 2015).
19. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 2, 58.
20. Rising basketball star Len Bias died from a cocaine overdose two days after being drafted
by the Boston Celtics. Rosa Goldensohn, They Shared Drugs. Someone Died. Does That Make
Them Killers?, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2xdSzPy [https://perma.cc/PWN2VVLH]. A friend of Bias was accused of providing the drugs but was later acquitted. Id. The
outcry over Bias’s death spurred jurisdictions to pursue drug dealers, who were referred to by one
senator as “greed-soaked mutants.” Id.
21. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 2; Jon Schuppe, 30 Years After Basketball Star Len Bias’
Death, Its Drug War Impact Endures, NBC NEWS (June 19, 2016, 8:37 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/30-years-after-basketball-star-len-bias-death-its-drug-n593731
[https://perma.cc/3FVP-4PQV]. On the federal level, Congress added a previously rejected
“death results” enhancement to the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), imposing a mandatory
minimum sentence of twenty years for distribution of certain controlled substances whose use
results in death. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2018); Brief for the United States at 3–4, Burrage v.
United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (No. 12-7515).
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DIH statutes, prosecutions under these provisions were initially rare.22
Rather than viewing overdose deaths as homicides, law enforcement
typically treated these tragedies as unintentional accidents with “no
crime involved.”23
In the last decade, however, the escalation of the U.S. opioid
epidemic has instigated a sharp rise in DIH prosecutions.24 Largely due
to the surge of prescription opioid addiction rates and the widespread
availability of heroin and synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, overdose
deaths dramatically increased.25 Though some advocates effectively
lobbied for harm reduction, prevention, and treatment interventions,
many elected officials instead pushed for punitive responses to a public
health crisis.26 As a result, prosecutors dusted off previously idle DIH
statutes and legislatures pushed to enact new ones.27
DIH statutes are often justified as a “law-and-order” solution to
the opioid epidemic.28 They are intended to penalize drug “kingpins”

22. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 2.
23. Mark M. Neil, Prosecuting Drug Overdose Cases: A Paradigm Shift, NAGTRI J., Feb.
2018, at 26, http://www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/journal/NAGTRI%20Journal%20Feb
%202018_final_pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2AT-QTS9].
24. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 7; see infra Part I.C.
25. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 5–7; see HOLLY HEDEGAARD, MARGARET WARNER &
ARIALDI M. MINIÑO, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1999–2016, at 1–2 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db294.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V78R-LLMM] (“The rate [of overdose deaths] increased on average by 10%
per year from 1999 to 2006, by 3% per year from 2006 to 2014, and by 18% per year from 2014 to
2016.”).
26. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 6–7, 15–16.
27. At least six states enacted DIH laws between 2003 and 2017. LASALLE, supra note 4, at
56–60. Additionally, in 2019, North Carolina enacted a “Death by Distribution” statute, Act of
July 8, 2019, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws 83 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18.4 (2019)),
and Mississippi proposed its own DIH law. Infra note 267 and accompanying text. In 2018, the
U.S. Department of Justice even urged federal prosecutors to seek capital punishment for
overdose deaths when they considered it “appropriate.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Attorney General Sessions Issues Memo to U.S. Attorneys on the Use of Capital Punishment in
Drug-Related Prosecutions (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-generalsessions-issues-memo-us-attorneys-use-capital-punishment-drug-related [https://perma.cc/JF97Q53A].
28. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 7; see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35.1.1 (West 2016) (targeting
“those repeat drug offenders and upper echelon members of organized narcotics trafficking
networks who pose the greatest danger to society”); Act approved June 4, 2003, No. 54, sec. 1,
2003 Vt. Acts & Resolves 141, 141 (codified as amended in scattered sections of VT. STAT. ANN.
tits. 13, 18, 23 (West 2020)) (“Many people who become addicted to illegal drugs resort to small
scale sale of drugs to support their addiction. This act is not directed at those people . . . .”).
Though the statutes identify their purpose as targeting large-scale drug dealers, their plain text
imposes liability for “[a]ny person” who delivers the controlled substance that results in death.
E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9(a) (emphasis added).
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by providing strict punishments to deter “the most culpable and
dangerous” drug dealers.29 The reality, however, is that prosecutions
not only target “entrepreneurial drug dealers who traffic in large
amounts of illegal drugs for profit,”30 but also focus on friends, family,
and partners of the deceased.31 Because proving the direct cause of
death can be difficult, prosecutors tend to focus on the last person to
touch the drugs before the deceased consumed them rather than
charging large-scale dealers higher up in the distribution chain.32 Often,
the person charged is a fellow addict sharing drugs or is “simply the last
person to see the deceased alive.”33 Thus, rather than being essential
tools to curb the epidemic, these overbroad laws unnecessarily add to
an abundance of available statutes for prosecuting drug offenses.34
While affirming Jarret’s conviction, the Louisiana Court of Appeal
acknowledged that while the DIH statute may have been intended to
target “sellers of drugs,” it effectively “provide[d] for a much larger
class of offenders”; namely, “anyone who simply physically delivers a
proscribed drug.”35
Moreover, DIH statutes require no intent toward the death itself.
This enables the widespread surge in DIH prosecutions, despite the
“universal and persistent” tenet of criminal law that “injury can
amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention.”36 DIH statutes do
not require mens rea (criminal intent) for the homicide, thus operating
either explicitly or implicitly as strict liability crimes.37 A defendant

29. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-1.1; see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18.4(a) (encouraging
“the criminal justice system to hold illegal drug dealers accountable”).
30. Sec. 1, 2003 Vt. Acts & Resolves 141.
31. See Drug-Induced Homicide, supra note 13 (estimating that at least half of all DIH
prosecutions are brought against friends, family members, or partners of the deceased).
32. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 42.
33. Id.
34. Infra notes 262–63 and accompanying text.
35. State v. McCasland, 218 So. 3d 1119, 1126 (La. Ct. App. 2017).
36. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
37. See Neil, supra note 23, at 27 (describing the various approaches states have used to
prosecute DIH cases). Strict liability offenses do not necessarily mean that no mental state is
necessary to commit the crime. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 358–59 (6th ed. 2017).
Rather, “a crime may be defined so as to require one type of fault as to one element, another type
as to another element, and no fault at all as to a third element.” Id. Essentially, “strict liability
crimes contain a material element for which the actor’s culpability is irrelevant.” Alan C.
Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 830 (1999). These offenses are not
always explicitly defined as strict liability, as “[i]t is rare if ever that the legislature states
affirmatively in a statute that described conduct is a crime though done without fault.” LAFAVE,
supra, at 359.
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must be “culpable for the underlying distribution offense but no
culpability is required for the deadly result.”38 Functionally, this
“ease[s] the prosecution’s path to conviction,”39 as the government
only has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intended to deliver the banned substance, not that the defendant
intended to kill.40
Legislatures enjoy expansive freedom to determine “the extent to
which moral culpability should be a prerequisite to conviction.”41 Even
so, enacting laws that impose harsh penalties but contain no minimum
mens rea requirements runs counter to what is widely considered to be
the very foundation of American criminal jurisprudence.42 Mens rea is
often regarded as “the measuring rod for our system of criminal
responsibility,”43 essential to imposing liability for causing death.44
Unsurprisingly, then, strict liability criminal laws and their logical
counterpart, the felony murder doctrine, have been heavily criticized
as denying due process.45 These laws premise liability on a false
construct of blameworthiness rather than assessing defendants via a
measure of true culpability.46

38. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1170 (N.J. 1994).
39. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263.
40. McCasland, 218 So. 3d at 1127. DIH statutes usually cover a broad range of behavior
such as distributing, dispensing, and delivering drugs. Functionally, this means they cover “anyone
who simply physically delivers a proscribed drug.” Id. at 1126 (emphasis added). Thus, the statutes
are sometimes read so broadly as to provoke absurd results. To quote Judge Richard Posner,
vacating a DIH homicide conviction:
Suppose you have lunch with a friend, order two hamburgers, and when your
hamburgers are ready you pick them up at the food counter and bring them back to the
table and he eats one and you eat the other. It would be very odd to describe what you
had done as “distributing” the food to him.
Weldon v. United States, 840 F.3d 865, 866 (7th Cir. 2016).
41. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 545 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
42. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 731
(1960). See generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933)
[hereinafter Sayre, Public Welfare] (outlining the rise of the exception for public welfare offenses
and arguing that, despite the presence of this exception, a mens rea requirement is still vitally
necessary for certain crimes).
43. Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 763, 771 (1999).
44. See Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 56 (“To inflict substantial punishment upon
one . . . who caused injury through reasonable mistake or pure accident, would so outrage the
feelings of the community as to nullify its own enforcement.”).
45. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 43, at 763 (describing the felony murder rule’s imposition of
strict homicide liability as “unfair, unprincipled and inconsistent with other criminal and civil
standards”).
46. Id. at 771.
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The relationship between mental state and punishment, a concept
which is almost intuitive,47 is so fundamental to criminal law as to seem
worthy of a constitutional guarantee.48 The irrationality of strict
liability crimes, in the due process sense, is that they lack the basic
requirement of actual blameworthiness—namely, the “social stigma
which a finding of guilt carries that distinguishes the criminal penalty
from all other sanctions.”49 Although due process requires that every
element of an offense be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,50 strict
liability offenses lessen this burden, elevating the convenience of the
prosecution over the interests of the defendant.51 Yet strict liability
offenses, and DIH laws in particular, are frequently and almost
invariably upheld as constitutional.52 As DIH prosecutions surge and
an increasing number of defendants like Jarret are tarred with the
brush of murderer,53 it becomes more difficult to understand how this
is consistent with due process.
This Note grapples with that difficulty, asserting that mens rea is
an indispensable due process protection in homicide law, even if it is
not a constitutional guarantee. By examining the development of strict
liability offenses in the American legal system, this Note contends that
DIH laws, though not facially unconstitutional, are functionally anti-

47. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952) (suggesting that a criminal intent
requirement “is almost as instinctive as the child’s familiar exculpatory ‘But I didn’t mean to’”).
48. For a discussion on why the notion that “the criminal sanction is inappropriate in the
absence of mens rea” has not been as embraced by courts as it has been by legal scholars, and how
the Court’s failure to create an “adequate method of interpretation of criminal statutes” without
explicit mens rea requirements has compounded the issue, see Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and
the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 107–11 [hereinafter Packer, Mens Rea].
49. Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: III—The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal
Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337, 404–05 (1989).
50. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
51. See Joseph E. Kennedy, The Story of Staples and the Innocent Machine Gun Owner: The
Good, the Bad and the Dangerous, in CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 85, 89 (Donna Coker & Robert
Weisberg eds., 2013) (“Since unsafe or unsanitary conditions could threaten the welfare of many
people at once, the legislature was presumed to be deliberately omitting mental state
requirements in order to ease the burden of proof of prosecutors . . . .”).
52. Infra Part III; see also Michaels, supra note 37, at 832 (“[F]or over seventy-five years the
Court has affirmed and reaffirmed that strict liability as a general matter is constitutional.”).
53. See LASALLE, supra note 4, at 11 (“Though many drug-induced homicide laws have sat
idly on the books since their enactment decades ago, prosecutors are now reinvigorating them
with a rash of drug-induced homicide charges in the wake of increasing overdose deaths.”).
Recent analyses of media mentions of DIH prosecutions suggest they increased by 300 percent
from 2011 to 2016. Id.

PHILLIPS IN PRINTER FINAL

2020]

FROM OVERDOSE TO CRIME SCENE

11/16/2020 7:39 PM

667

constitutional—inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of due
process.54 While previous literature on these laws has focused on their
potential Eighth Amendment concerns or their myriad policy
implications,55 no concerted attempt has been made to analyze DIH
statutes within the greater context of the often-confounding strict
liability criminal jurisprudence. This Note makes that attempt, arguing
these statutes, as they are frequently applied, impose punishments far
in excess of the culpability they require.
To be clear, this Note does not articulate a specific constitutional
challenge to these laws, nor does it contend with the potential
difficulties in raising such a challenge. Rather, it lays out a conceptual
roadmap to understand the tensions inherent in these statutes, drawing
on constitutional principles to examine their inconsistencies with due
process. It asserts that these inconsistencies render these statutes not
only irrational, but also counter to the very framework that shapes our
understanding of criminal law. Finally, given the futility of these laws
and the numerous concerns they raise, this Note calls on state
legislatures to repeal or amend DIH statutes to reconcile them with the
protections our system guarantees to criminal defendants.
Part I describes the opioid epidemic and evaluates public health
and criminal justice responses to the crisis. Part II analyzes the
historical roots of the mens rea requirement, discussing the rise of the
public welfare exception and examining the complicated jurisprudence

54. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (stating the means the
government uses to achieve its ends must be “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the
constitution”).
55. See generally Leo Beletsky, America’s Favorite Antidote: Drug-Induced Homicide in the
Age of the Overdose Crisis, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 833 (examining DIH laws through the lens of
public health and advocating for an inter-disciplinary approach rather than a criminal response);
J. Richard Broughton, The Opioid Crisis and the Federal Death Penalty, 70 S.C. L. REV. 611 (2019)
(advocating for the passage of a federal death penalty statute to prosecute DIH cases, but
acknowledging the potential for Eighth Amendment issues); James H. Knight, Note, The First
Hit’s Free . . . Or Is It? Criminal Liability for Drug-Induced Death in New Jersey, 34 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1327 (2004) (arguing that New Jersey’s DIH law, as applied, contravenes legislative
intent); Stormie B. Mauck, Note, Drug Dealer or Murderer? Pennsylvania’s Approach to Drug
Delivery Resulting in Death, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 813 (2019) (discussing Eighth Amendment
challenges to Pennsylvania’s DIH law and concluding the DIH law, though constitutional, is
ineffective and costly); Lynne H. Rambo, Note, An Unconstitutional Fiction: The Felony Murder
Rule as Applied to the Supply of Drugs, 20 GA. L. REV. 671 (1986) (arguing that applying felony
murder logic to DIH laws contradicts longstanding causation and proportionality principles,
potentially creating Eighth Amendment violations); Blair Talty, Note, New Jersey’s Strict
Liability for Drug-Induced Deaths: The Leap from Drug Dealer to Murderer, 30 RUTGERS L.J.
513 (1999) (describing New Jersey’s law as a harsh legislative overreach, flagging a potential due
process concern before engaging in an Eighth Amendment analysis).
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surrounding strict liability offenses and felony murder. Part III
examines DIH statutes in light of due process concerns, highlighting
their constitutional implications and inconsistencies. Part IV calls for a
legislative response, arguing that retributive measures that deny liberty
without requiring appropriate culpability offend the fundamental
notions of justice necessary to maintain the moral ballast of our legal
system.
I. THE RISE OF DIH STATUTES
Drug-related overdose fatalities in the United States have nearly
quadrupled since the beginning of the twenty-first century, resulting in
a devastating and rapidly growing public health crisis.56 Although state
and federal governments have only recently described the current state
of affairs as an “epidemic,”57 legislative attempts to reckon with
America’s deep dependence upon opioids are not new.58 This Part first
provides a background of responses to the opioid crisis and then
examines the enactment and enforcement of DIH laws.
A. The War on Drugs and Initial DIH Enactments
Though American society had a relatively permissive attitude
toward narcotic use in the early half of the Republic, social and moral
concerns prompted regulatory changes around the beginning of the
twentieth century.59 Descriptions of drug users as criminals and
“deviant” addicts fueled public support for increasingly punitive
measures.60 As federal regulations cracked down on physicians who

56. Beletsky, supra note 55, at 840.
57. Id. at 844–46; see, e.g., Press Release, Roy Cooper, Governor of North Carolina,
Governor Cooper Signs the Opioid Response Act and Other Bills Into Law (July 22, 2019), https:/
/governor.nc.gov/news/governor-cooper-signs-opioid-response-act-and-other-bills-law [https://
perma.cc/NJU5-99BE] (describing the passage of the Opioid Epidemic Response Act); Press
Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, FACTSHEET: Obama Administration
Announces Public and Private Sector Efforts to Address Prescription Drug Abuse and Heroin
Use (Oct. 21, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/21/fact-sheet
-obama-administration-announces-public-and-private-sector [https://perma.cc/DS7D-BZHN]
(describing the prescription drug and heroin crisis as an “epidemic”).
58. See Katharine A. Neill, Tough on Drugs: Law and Order Dominance and the Neglect of
Public Health in U.S. Drug Policy, 6 WORLD MED. & HEALTH POL’Y 375, 380–85 (2014) (tracing
the development of U.S. drug policy from the 1900s through the 1980s).
59. Id. at 380–81.
60. See id. at 381 (“This construction of the addict as psychologically dysfunctional paved the
way for public support of incarcerating addicts in later decades.”); see also A Brief History of the
Drug War, DRUG POL’Y ALL., http://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war [https://
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sold narcotics, an expanding black market developed for heroin,
opium, and cocaine, furthering the image that drug use was a primarily
criminal activity.61
Despite some subtle shifts toward expanding treatment,62 the lawand-order approach to drug regulation dominated the latter half of the
century. In the 1980s, federal and state governments increased law
enforcement funding to wage the “war on drugs,” escalated the
criminalization of drug use, and ramped up fervent anti-drug rhetoric.63
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, for example, imposed new
mandatory minimum sentences for possession of controlled substances
and expanded the punitive focus to include drug users, not just highlevel distributors.64 These policies, combined with increased media
attention and public pressure to appear “tough on crime,” spurred
federal and state politicians of both parties to champion harsher
statutory solutions, including DIH laws.65 Despite this push, these laws
were rarely enforced in the first few decades of their existence. This
apathy is possibly explained by predominating stereotypes of overdose
victims as deviant addicts unworthy of assistance,66 or by the perception
of the opioid epidemic as solely an “urban” problem, not one shared
by society at large.67
These DIH statutes remained mostly unused even as the growing
prevalence of prescription opioids led to an increase in overdose deaths
in the 1990s.68 Between 1999 and 2011, oxycodone consumption

perma.cc/94PH-PSU7] (noting that initial anti-drug legislation was disproportionately targeted at
Chinese immigrant populations, Black men in the South, and Mexican migrants).
61. See Neill, supra note 58, at 380–81 (describing the passage of the Harrison Narcotic Drug
Act of 1914); Beletsky, supra note 55, at 853 (“In the years since the establishment of this drug
control framework, the availability and purity of illicit substances on the American black market
have only increased, while their prices have fallen.”).
62. See Neill, supra note 58, at 383 (“This shift in the social construction of the addict
necessitated a shift in the policy tools used . . . [as] evidenced in the expansion of drug
treatment . . . .”).
63. Id.; A Brief History of the Drug War, supra note 60.
64. Neill, supra note 58, at 384.
65. Id.; LASALLE, supra note 4, at 2.
66. See Neill, supra note 58, at 380 (discussing depictions of drug users as “undeserving”).
67. See id. at 387 (discussing the overtones of drug-war rhetoric and stating that “[r]ace rarely
was mentioned explicitly; instead the discussion was couched in terms of ‘urban’ and ‘inner city’
drug use”). As a “whiter and wealthier” generation of drug users emerged, id. at 383,
policymakers perhaps became more apt to view those who died of overdoses as victims.
68. Opioid Basics: Understanding the Epidemic, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention
(Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/KZP47RKA].
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increased by almost 500 percent;69 in the same time period, the opioidoverdose death rate more than tripled.70 Subsequent efforts to restrict
opioid access had unintended consequences, as restrictions upon
prescription opioids caused many dependent patients to transition to
black market drugs, particularly heroin.71 This, coupled with the arrival
of synthetic and highly potent opioids such as fentanyl, caused the
overdose death rate to surge again, increasing from 45,055 overdose
deaths in 2014 to 67,367 in 2018.72
B. A Harm-Reduction Approach
In response to this rapid increase of deaths, and with a growing
recognition that drug war policies failed to effectively reduce drug use,
alternative approaches to the zero-tolerance law-and-order model
have emerged.73 Intensified lobbying for a public health approach to

69. Andrew Kolodny, David T. Courtwright, Catherine S. Hwang, Peter Kreiner, John L.
Eadie, Thomas W. Clark & G. Caleb Alexander, The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A
Public Health Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 2015 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 560,
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122957 [https://perma.cc/
ZY56-W3BW].
70. LI HUI CHEN, HOLLY HEDEGAARD & MARGARET WARNER, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STAT., DRUG-POISONING DEATHS INVOLVING OPIOID ANALGESICS: UNITED STATES, 1999–
2011, at 1 (2014).
71. See Sarah G. Mars, Philippe Bourgois, George Karandinos, Fernando Montero & Daniel
Ciccarone, “Every ‘Never’ I Ever Said Came True”: Transitions from Opioid Pills to Heroin
Injecting, 25 INT. J. DRUG POL’Y 257, 265 (2014) (describing study results suggesting that “medical
and regulatory attempts to curb this [widespread availability of opioids] through monitoring and
limiting prescribing, appear to be drawing a new generation into higher risk heroin injecting”);
see also Opioid Basics, supra note 68 (describing the “second wave” of the opioid crisis arriving
around 2010 with the increased prevalence of heroin use).
72. Rose A. Rudd, Puja Seth, Felicita David & Lawrence Scholl, Ctrs. for Disease Control
& Prevention, Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths—United States, 2010–
2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1445, 1445 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
volumes/65/wr/mm655051e1.htm [https://perma.cc/9JJK-YX66]; see Opioid Basics, supra note 68
(describing the “third wave” of the opioid crisis). Several reports suggest that opioid overdose
rates are increasing even more during the COVID-19 pandemic. AM. MED. ASS’N, ADVOCACY
RESOURCE CENTER, ISSUE BRIEF: REPORTS OF INCREASES IN OPIOID RELATED OVERDOSE
AND OTHER CONCERNS DURING COVID PANDEMIC passim (2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/
system/files/2020-09/issue-brief-increases-in-opioid-related-overdose.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A
TH-MW2B] (compiling national and state reports on increasing opioid-use mortality rates). The
true scope of the fallout from the pandemic may not be known for some time.
73. See Neill, supra note 58, at 387–89 (describing the shift to a “harm-reduction approach
[which] recognizes the permanence of drugs in society and instead of trying to eradicate drug use,
focuses on minimizing harm associated with drug use for the individual and society”). This shift
to a more compassionate approach may be partly spurred by the fact that heroin is now “ravaging
largely white communities,” rather than being perceived as just an epidemic based in “poor,
predominantly black urban areas.” Katharine Q. Seelye, In Heroin Crisis, White Families Seek
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the crisis has obtained key legislative reforms.74 After recognizing that
years of “just say no” policies resulted in a lack of accurate information
concerning safe drug use, advocates have increasingly pushed to
educate drug users on how to mitigate the risk of overdose.75 This
education focuses on best practices such as injecting in the presence of
other people and obtaining drugs from a consistent, trusted source.76
Enabling such reforms is a shift in public perceptions of addiction
and how it should be addressed.77 Increased drug-usage rates78 now
make it far more likely that an individual has been affected by
addiction, either through personal experience or through the
experience of someone they know. These experiences may make
addiction seem more relatable and less deserving of punishment.79 Set
within the broader context of a bipartisan, nationwide shift toward
criminal justice reform,80 general perception is starting to trend toward
viewing the opioid crisis as a “public health problem and not just a
criminal problem.”81
Gentler War on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1KKw5zt [https://perma.cc/
H456-KMVM].
74. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 6. Typical reforms include increasing access to overdose
reversal agents such as naloxone and enacting “Good Samaritan” laws, which provide limited
criminal immunity to individuals seeking help when witnessing an overdose. Id.
75. HARM REDUCTION COAL., GETTING OFF RIGHT: A SAFETY MANUAL FOR INJECTION
DRUG USERS 1 (2020), https://harmreduction.org/issues/safer-drug-use/injection-safety-manual
[https://perma.cc/VXU5-ZETY].
76. See id. at 4, 67 (suggesting that “[h]aving another person around . . . can be a safety net”
and recommending “purchas[ing] your drugs from a regular source”).
77. A poll conducted in 2014 showed that two-thirds of Americans believe the government
should focus more on treatment than on obtaining prosecutions. America’s New Drug Policy
Landscape, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.people-press.org/2014/04/02/americasnew-drug-policy-landscape [https://perma.cc/3SJC-LFC5].
78. See, e.g., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE
AND MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2018 NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 1 (2019), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/
cbhsq-reports/NSDUHNationalFindingsReport2018/NSDUHNationalFindingsReport2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y2UR-CPQ3] (estimating that nearly one out of every five people at least twelve
years of age used an illicit drug in 2018, a higher percentage than recorded in 2015 and 2016);
Elizabeth D. Kantor, Colin D. Rehm, Jennifer S. Haas, Andrew T. Chan & Edward L. Giovannucci,
Trends in Prescription Drug Use Among Adults in the United States From 1999-2012, 314 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 1818, 1825 (2015) (finding that U.S. prescription drug use “increased from 51% in 1999-2000
to 59% in 2011-2012”).
79. Neill, supra note 58, at 388.
80. See Beletsky, supra note 55, at 867 (describing various bipartisan shifts away from harsh
punitive measures and toward sentencing reform and penalty reductions for certain drugs).
81. Jon Schuppe, Obama Pushes for More Treatment for Opioid Addiction, NBC NEWS (Mar.
29, 2016, 4:18 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/americas-heroin-epidemic/obama-pushesmore-treatment-opioid-addiction-n547441 [https://perma.cc/ZD5Y-9ARS] (quoting President
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C. The Revitalized Use of DIH Laws
Despite this shift, the criminal justice system still plays an outsized
role in responding to the opioid crisis. To combat overdose deaths,
many officials have returned to the tools of law enforcement and
prosecution.82 Several prosecutors actively seek assistance in deploying
these DIH laws, training law enforcement officers to “[t]reat an
overdose scene as a homicide scene from the beginning” of a death
investigation.83 Law enforcement officers and legislators are
increasingly vocal about their intent to use DIH statutes as a way to
deter drug trafficking and use,84 with various prosecutors stating they
do not care if the defendant is themselves an addict, or even if the
defendant did not sell drugs to the deceased.85 Though many of these
laws also state their purpose is to prevent overdose deaths,86 no
empirical evidence suggests that increased prosecution or a heightened
threat of prosecution leads to a reduction in the death rate.87 In fact,

Barack Obama’s remarks at the National Rx Drug Abuse and Heroin Summit in March 2016). Also,
likely instigating this shift is the changing demographics of addicts, summarized by epidemiologist
Dr. Daniel Ciccarone: “We had a white epidemic; we changed our tune.” Dan Vergano, This Was
the Decade Drug Overdoses Killed Nearly Half A Million Americans, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 6,
2019, 12:14 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/danvergano/opioid-overdose-decade-waron-drugs [https://perma.cc/MS32-MB54].
82. Neil, supra note 23, at 26. Prosecutor Damon Tyner describes the decision to resurrect
the “underutilized” law that “kind of fell off the radar as a tool” as a necessary step “at this current
stage of the battle.” Joe Hernandez, Atlantic County Ramps up Drug-Induced Homicide
Prosecutions, WHYY (June 11, 2018), https://whyy.org/articles/atlantic-county-ramps-up-druginduced-homicide-prosecutions [https://perma.cc/V2BH-JV9N].
83. Patricia Daugherty & Nick Stachula, Drug-Related Homicides: Investigative and
Prosecutorial Strategies at the National RX Drug Abuse & Heroin Summit 23 (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://naloxonestudy.org/resources/Drug-Related_Homicides_Investigative_and_Prosecutorial
_Strategies.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK8D-9RYB].
84. See Peck, supra note 3 (quoting Madison County State’s Attorney Tom Gibbons as
saying, “We intend to absolutely make an example of these people in public . . . . I want to give
them the fear of becoming the soulless people addicts become”).
85. See Stephanie Grady, “It’s Been Used More and More,” But is Wisconsin’s Len Bias Law
an Effective Deterrent to Opioid Abuse?, FOX6 MILWAUKEE (Nov. 21, 2016, 9:51 PM), https://
fox6now.com/2016/11/21/its-been-used-more-and-more-but-is-wisconsins-len-bias-law-an-effectivedeterrent-to-opioid-abuse [https://perma.cc/7JW6-2SZJ] (quoting Sheboygan County District
Attorney Joe DeCecco as saying, “A person died, so it doesn’t matter to me whether the person who
delivered it is a fellow junkie, is a friend, didn’t sell it but actually gave it to them”).
86. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18.4 (2019) (“[D]eaths due to the opioid epidemic are
devastating families and communities . . . . Therefore, the General Assembly enacts this law to
encourage effective intervention by the criminal justice system . . . .”).
87. See LASALLE, supra note 4, at 21, 23–24, 26 (detailing rising overdose rates in states with
many DIH prosecutions). Conversely, countries that have embraced harm-reduction initiatives
and decriminalization have seen declining deaths and addiction rates. Shefali Luthra, How
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DIH laws may have the opposite effect, dissuading people from
seeking medical attention for overdoses.88 Only two states provide
immunity from DIH charges for a person seeking medical assistance
for an overdose;89 in every other state with a DIH law, a person may be
placed in the untenable position of letting a friend die, or risking
prosecution for homicide.
Although specific data on the number of prosecutions under these
statutes is largely unavailable, analyses of online media trends—
harnessed using big data techniques common to the health sector—
demonstrate a significant increase in DIH prosecutions since 2010.90
Nationwide, news articles about individuals charged with DIH
increased from 363 in 2011 to 1,178 in 2016, an increase of over 300
percent.91
FIGURE 1. NATIONWIDE DIH CHARGES BROUGHT FROM 1974–2017.92

This rise in prosecutions is even more apparent when examined at
a state-by-state level. An investigative news report in Wisconsin
Germany Averted an Opioid Crisis, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 11, 2019), https://khn.org/
MTAwODU0MA [https://perma.cc/2BFF-Z7FX].
88. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 3.
89. Id. at 40 (Vermont and Delaware).
90. See Beletsky, supra note 55, at 871–73, for a detailed overview of the data collection
methodology employed to track media mentions of DIH prosecutions. Professor Leo Beletsky
acknowledges that while media collection techniques are not optimal, they are being “used with
increasing frequency and precision” in the health care sector. Id. at 872. Additionally, a
comparison of Pennsylvania cases captured by the media database with that state’s court records
suggested that even more cases were being brought than was reflected by the media coverage. Id.
at 874–75.
91. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 2.
92. This data was sourced from various online news sources compiled by Health in Justice
Action Lab and was last updated on September 18, 2019. Drug-Induced Homicide, supra note 13.
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revealed that while more than 500 people were charged with DIH
between 2000 and 2016, more than half of those charges were filed in
the last four years of that range alone.93 Per court documents,
Pennsylvania DIH charges steadily increased from 15 cases charged
per year to 205 cases charged per year between 2013 and 2017.94
Meanwhile, New Jersey, which enacted a strict liability DIH law in
1987, has seen spikes at the county level.95 Between 1988 and 2016, the
Atlantic County Prosecutor’s Office charged only 16 DIH offenses; in
2018, the office had already brought 13 charges by June.96
This increase in prosecutions is facilitated by the strict liability
nature of most DIH laws. Some states, such as New Jersey, explicitly
do not require proof of mens rea with respect to the death,97 while other
states, such as Pennsylvania, imply it, requiring only proof of mens rea
toward the drug distribution and none toward the resulting death.98
Other states, such as Florida, fold their DIH provision into a felony
murder rule, listing drug distribution as one of many predicate felonies
imposing liability for an accidental homicide.99 With this minimal mens
rea requirement in place, a prosecutor seeking a homicide charge only
needs to prove the defendant had intent to deliver drugs. The
prosecutor can prove this intent even if the defendant did not purchase
or sell the drugs, and even if the defendant had no intent to kill. So far,
these laws have been viewed as constitutional. Part II explains why that
is so, despite their potential inconsistencies with due process.

93. Bryan Polcyn, High-Level Drug Dealers Rarely Charged with Drug-Related Homicides as
Wisconsin Death Toll Reaches 10K, FOX6 MILWAUKEE (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.fox6now.com/
news/high-level-drug-dealers-rarely-charged-with-drug-related-homicides-as-wisconsin-death-tollreaches-10k [https://perma.cc/2FKC-X873] (detailing the spike in Wisconsin DIH prosecutions).
94. Drug Delivery Resulting in Death Citations at Five-Year High, UNIFIED JUD. SYS. PA.
(Mar. 9, 2018), http://www.pacourts.us/news-and-statistics/news?Article=959 [https://perma.cc/
7P6U-M8CP].
95. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 32.
96. Hernandez, supra note 82.
97. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2016) (“Any person who manufactures,
distributes or dispenses . . . any . . . controlled dangerous substance . . . is strictly liable for a death
which results from the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that substance . . . .”).
98. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2506(a) (2015) (“A person commits a felony of the first
degree if the person intentionally . . . dispenses, delivers . . . or distributes any controlled
substance . . . and another person dies as a result of using the substance.”). The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts recently noted that “at least eighteen States” have enacted strict liability
DIH laws. Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 131 N.E.3d 812, 827 n.9 (Mass. 2019).
99. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(3)(4) (West 2017).
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II. MENS REA AND DUE PROCESS: A LEGAL BACKGROUND
The legitimacy of DIH statutes depends in large part on the
answer to an oft-raised question: Is there a due process mens rea
guarantee? The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments are frequently read as being grounded in the notion of
fundamental fairness.100 That guarantee of fairness is violated if a
practice “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”101
If mens rea is, in fact, so rooted in our tradition as to be
fundamental, DIH statutes’ presumption of constitutionality does not
seem to accord with the spirit of due process. Furthermore, even if
there is no explicit mens rea guarantee in the Constitution itself, are
DIH laws antithetical to our “deepest notions of what is fair and right
and just”?102 In attempting to address these challenges, this Part
examines the development of mens rea as a fundamental part of
American law, describes the jurisprudence surrounding public welfare
offenses, and attempts to reconcile mens rea’s not quite—but almost—
constitutional status.
A. The Foundational Nature of Mens Rea in Criminal Jurisprudence
The centrality of mens rea in criminal law developed early in
English jurisprudence. While the early medieval English regime
tended toward liability without wrongful intent, by the fourteenth
century the focus shifted toward subjective blameworthiness and
considerations of the accused’s mental state.103 The twin influences of
Roman law, with its notions of dolus and culpa, and canonical law, with
its concepts of moral guilt and sin, heavily steered criminal law toward
a focus on culpability and moral wrongdoing.104 The maxim “actus non
100. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416–17 (1945) (“[R]eview of that guaranty of
[due process] inescapably [requires] this Court . . . to ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking
peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.”).
101. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
102. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), abrogated by
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
103. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 978–80 (1932) [hereinafter Sayre,
Mens Rea].
104. Id. at 983. Dolus refers to an intentional violation of the law, whereas culpa refers to a
negligent violation of the law, demonstrating the Roman legal focus upon mental state. H.D.J.
Bodenstein, Phases in the Development of Criminal Mens Rea, 36 S. AFR. L.J. 323, 324 (1919).
Henry Bracton, a highly influential thirteenth-century English cleric and jurist, drew heavily from
canonical sources such as Saint Augustine to determine that “a crime is not committed unless the
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facit reum nisi mens sit rea”—an act does not make one guilty unless
one’s mind is guilty—became ingrained in the common-law tradition,
as reflected in the writings of jurists such as Sir Francis Bacon and
Edward Coke.105 By the mid-eighteenth century, William Blackstone’s
broad statement that a “vicious will” is necessary for an act to
constitute a crime was universally accepted.106 Following this principle,
judges at common law interpreted crimes as requiring not only a
prescribed act or omission, but also a prescribed state of mind.107
Accordingly, mens rea became accepted as a “sacred principle of
criminal jurisprudence.”108
As mens rea developed for the general body of criminal law, its
emergence became an essential factor for “true crimes”109 in general
and for homicide in particular, “gradual[ly] freeing from criminal
responsibility . . . those who killed without guilty intent.”110 The
interests of the individual, “demand[ing] maximum liberty and
freedom from interference,” were of such importance that the system
was concerned with preventing potential injustices.111 It was considered
reprehensible “[t]o inflict substantial punishment upon one who [was]
morally entirely innocent.”112 Coupled with the logic that unintentional
acts were not considered as menacing to society as intentional acts
were, the individual interests at stake in the case of “true crimes” were

intention to injure exists.” Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role
of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 655 (quoting 2 HENRY
DE BRACTON, BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 384 (Samuel E. Thorne
trans., 1968)); see also id. at 659 (reading Bracton “as embracing the notion that both bad motive
and intentional acts are essential for criminal liability”).
105. See Sayre, Mens Rea, supra note 103, at 988, 993 (“[I]t was universally accepted law that
an evil intent was as necessary for felony as the act itself.”); LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 313–14
(“[I]n more recent times (i.e., since about 1600), the judges have generally defined common law
crimes in terms which require, in addition to prescribed action or omission, some prescribed bad
state of mind . . . .”).
106. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note
1, at 21).
107. LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 313–14.
108. Sayre, Mens Rea, supra note 103, at 974 n.2 (quoting Duncan v. State, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.)
148, 150 (1846)).
109. This Note uses the term “true crime” in the same way as scholar Francis Bowes Sayre in
Public Welfare Offenses, referring to certain crimes, such as murder and theft, that necessitate a
showing of intent. Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 80. Sayre argued that extending the
public welfare doctrine to true crimes “would sap the vitality of the criminal law.” See id. at 56,
84 (“[M]ens rea is as vitally necessary for true crime as understanding is necessary for goodness.”).
110. Sayre, Mens Rea, supra note 103, at 995.
111. Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 68.
112. Id. at 56.
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so significant they demanded the prerequisite of “evil intent” in order
to be justifiably punished.113
Even after most American jurisdictions abolished common-law
crimes, they still imported mens rea into their criminal statutes, further
enshrining its importance in criminal law.114 Though definitions of
mens rea have varied, the modern trend describes it as the mental state
necessary to commit a defined element of an offense.115 Thus, mens rea
has become so ingrained in the American system that it “is as universal
and persistent . . . as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose
between good and evil.”116 Yet, despite this consistent focus on mens
rea as a necessary predicate for punishment, a large body of strict
liability offenses emerged.
B. Strict Liability Crimes
Criminal law is, in theory, hostile to strict liability crimes.117 The
departure from the traditional mens rea requirement is frequently
criticized as irreconcilable with fundamental standards of culpability.118
Yet, despite these critiques, a vast body of strict liability offenses exists

113. Id. at 68.
114. LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 314; see also Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 703 (1877)
(“All punitive legislation contemplates some relation between guilt and punishment. To inflict
the latter where the former does not exist would shock the sense of justice of every one.”).
115. This definition of mens rea is sometimes referred to as the narrower or “elemental”
approach. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 169 (7th ed. 2016). The
broader “culpability” approach views criminal acts as requiring a morally culpable state of mind,
considering an individual guilty if they committed a socially harmful act with any morally
blameworthy state of mind. Id. The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) wholeheartedly embraces the
elemental approach, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 1, at 229–31 (AM. L. INST. 1962), requiring
specific culpability in order to issue condemnation, a concept its drafters considered “too
fundamental to be compromised,” id. § 2.05 cmt. 1, at 283.
116. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952).
117. Kennedy, supra note 51, at 88; see United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437–
38 (1978) (explaining that strict liability offenses have a “generally disfavored status”).
118. Wasserstrom, supra note 42, at 734; see generally id. (providing an overview of the
voluminous scholarship criticizing strict liability and cataloguing various arguments for and
against the doctrine). Critics of the doctrine argue that imposing criminal punishment on someone
who did not intend to produce the result of their conduct does not serve at least two of the primary
justifications of criminal law: deterrence and rehabilitation. Id. at 734. Conversely, proponents
argue that the existence of strict liability offenses influences people to act with greater caution
when engaging in certain activities or keeps people from engaging in them entirely. Id. at 737.
These proponents also point to the vast number of strict liability offenses, reasoning that even if
they should be condemned, their sheer scope shows that they decidedly are not. Id. at 741.
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in federal and state law.119 To fully appreciate the tension present in
strict liability criminal law—and the innate issues DIH statutes
implicate—it is necessary to examine the conflicting ways the Supreme
Court has approached strict liability offenses. This Section provides the
historical context necessary to understand how DIH laws are justified,
cataloging the emergence of the public welfare exception as well as the
Court’s attempt to cabin that very doctrine, and addressing the
continued presence of felony murder.
1. The Development of the Public Welfare Exception. Despite the
recognized importance of mens rea, the progressively complex social
order emerging out of the Industrial Revolution prompted exceptions
to its absolute requirement.120 The complications and growth from
industrialization—including traffic, congestion, and the wider
distribution of goods—created a pressing need for a vast regulatory
scheme; this scheme necessitated the creation of minor offenses that
could only be enforced effectively by disregarding state of mind.121
Criminal justice shifted its emphasis from protecting the individual to
preserving the public welfare, increasingly using criminal law to
enforce regulations by prohibiting acts that were not necessarily
morally blameworthy, but that, if left unchecked, would pose a threat
to the greater good.122
These public welfare laws—criminalizing such conduct as selling
intoxicants or impure food—required no proof that a defendant had
any intent to commit the offense.123 The offenses predominately
imposed low-level fines as a form of criminal sanction; incarceration, if
mandated, was typically for durations under a year.124 The lax criminal
119. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict
Liability, 62 DUKE L.J. 285 (2012) (cataloging the persistence of strict liability offenses in state
courts).
120. See Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 67 (describing the gradual use of strict
liability offenses to enforce the additional regulation required for a more complex society).
121. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 254–55 (“Such dangers have engendered increasingly
numerous and detailed regulations . . . . Lawmakers . . . sought to make such regulations more
effective by invoking criminal sanctions to be applied by the familiar technique of criminal
prosecutions and convictions.”); Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 68–69 (“[T]oday the
crowded conditions of life require social regulation to a degree never before attempted.”).
122. Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 68.
123. Id. at 70 n.54.
124. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright & Paul Huck, Counting Cases About Milk, Our “Most Nearly
Perfect” Food, 1860–1940, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 87 (2002) (surveying historical convictions
for the sale of adulterated milk and finding that “[f]ines were the overwhelming choice of
sanctions in the criminal cases.” They “ranged from $10 to $500, with $25 as the most common
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punishment and the lack of stigma carried by a lower charge tempered
the departure from the mens rea requirement.125 One justification for
upholding strict liability crimes was that since these regulatory offenses
were not truly punished in the same manner as “infamous crimes,” the
absence of mens rea was permissible.126 Though some influential
commentators have argued that any crime punishable by a felony
conviction or lengthy imprisonment requires mens rea and cannot be
considered a public welfare offense,127 courts have declined to draw a
firm boundary around the exact limits of the doctrine.128
2. Modern Strict Liability Doctrine. The Model Penal Code
(“MPC”)129 takes a direct approach, declaring “a frontal attack on
absolute or strict liability . . . whenever the offense carries the
possibility of criminal conviction.”130 However, the constitutional

amount”); see also MASS. STATE BD. OF HEALTH, LUNACY & CHARITY, FOURTH ANNUAL
REPORT 35 (1883) (“Whoever kills . . . for the purpose of sale, any calf less than four weeks
old . . . shall be punished by imprisonment . . . not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding
two hundred dollars . . . .”).
125. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256 (“[P]enalties commonly are relatively small, and
conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s reputation.”).
126. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 617 (1994) (quoting Tenement House Dep’t v.
McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 168 (1915)).
127. E.g., Sayre, Public Welfare, supra note 42, at 72.
128. The Court once hinted at a boundary in Staples v. United States:
Close adherence to [precedent] might suggest that punishing a violation as a felony is
simply incompatible with the theory of the public welfare offense. In this view, absent
a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is not required, we should not apply the
public welfare offense rationale to interpret any statute defining a felony offense as
dispensing with mens rea.
511 U.S. at 618–19. However, the Court immediately followed the above with a but see citation to
United States v. Balint. Id. at 618 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)). In Balint,
the Court upheld a strict liability offense under the Narcotics Act, which the Court characterized
as “a taxing act with the incidental purpose of minimizing the spread of addiction to the use of
poisonous and demoralizing drugs.” 258 U.S. at 253–54. A violation of the Narcotics Act was
punishable by a maximum five-year prison sentence, a fine of up to $2,000, or both. Act of Dec.
17, 1914, ch. 1, sec. 9, 38 Stat. 785, 789.
129. The MPC, first published by the American Law Institute in 1962, was developed “to
provide a reasoned, integrated body of material that will be useful in [a] legislative effort” to
reexamine criminal codes. Herbert Wechsler, The American Law Institute: Some Observations on
Its Model Penal Code, 42 A.B.A. J. 321, 321 (1956); Herbert Wechsler, Symposium on the Model
Penal Code Foreword, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 589, 589 (1963).
130. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. 1, at 282 (AM. L. INST. 1962). The MPC only allows
strict liability for crimes that are described as “violations” rather than “offenses,” and which carry
no greater punishment than a fine or penalty. Id. at 283, cmt. 2, at 291. Such violations include:
“Polluting Streams,” “Possessing a Machine Gun,” and “Shooting Domesticated Pigeons.” Id. at
cmt. 1, at 286, 288.
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doctrine around strict liability is decidedly less clear, muddied by the
Supreme Court’s inconsistent treatment of the mens rea requirement.
The Court disregarded due process concerns with multiple public
welfare offenses in the early twentieth century. It acknowledged that
dispensing with conventional mens rea requirements created the
“possible injustice of subjecting an innocent” to criminal penalties, but
ultimately concluded that it was permissible in the interest of the public
good.131 The Court seemed to rationalize its concern about any possible
injustices by placing its trust in prosecutorial discretion, relying on their
“conscience and circumspection” to protect the innocent.132 That trust
apparently did not last long, however, as later decisions suggested that
punishment without culpability could raise constitutional concerns.
In Morissette v. United States,133 the Court recognized public
welfare offenses as permissible but warned that the judiciary should
not extend the “impairment[s]” of these strict liability cases to
common-law crimes:134 specifically, that they should not remove due
process protections such as the presumption of innocence.135 The Court
seemed heavily influenced by the nature of the crime at issue in
Morissette—theft, one of the “earliest offenses known to the law.”136
Accordingly, the crime had such deep common-law roots that it was
only natural for the judiciary to read traditional mens rea presumptions
into the statute, despite no explicit direction from the legislature.137 The
Court took Morissette’s preoccupation with mens rea even further in
Lambert v. California,138 striking down a state statute as facially

131. Balint, 258 U.S. at 254; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943); see
Kennedy, supra note 51, at 90 (stating the Court “framed the issue as a simple tradeoff between
public danger and potential innocence”).
132. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913));
see also id. (“In such matters the good sense of prosecutors . . . must be trusted.”). Notably, the
dissent referred to this “blind resort” to prosecutorial discretion as “precisely what our
constitutional system sought to avoid.” Id. at 292 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
133. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
134. Id. at 262–63.
135. Id. at 275.
136. See id. at 260–61 (noting that, historically, state courts “have consistently retained the
requirement of intent in larceny-type offenses”).
137. See id. at 252 (“Even if their [statutory] enactments were silent on the subject, [state]
courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely
recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory
affirmation.” (emphasis added)).
138. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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violative of due process.139 In doing so, it indicated that punishment
without culpability might raise constitutional concerns. Though some
scholars predicted Lambert might finally elevate mens rea to
constitutional status,140 the case has remained an anomaly, rarely
followed by lower courts.141 Despite the pronouncements in Morissette
and Lambert, the Court continued to uphold strict liability criminal
offenses.142 The Court, however, again signaled an implicit mens rea
requirement in subsequent cases, most notably Staples v. United
States,143 which is frequently relied upon by state courts.144 Following
the principles laid out in Morissette, the Court overturned criminal
convictions by interpreting various federal statutes as requiring mens
rea—including offenses that were arguably traditional public welfare
laws.145
139. Id. at 229–30; see Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal
Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1269 (1998) (describing Lambert as the closest the Court has ever
come “to constitutionalizing a mens rea requirement as fundamental to the just imposition of a
criminal sanction”).
140. See Kennedy, supra note 51, at 92 (describing Lambert as a flirtation with the idea that
sufficient mens rea “was not just a statutory presumption grounded in common law tradition but
a matter of due process grounded in the Constitution itself” but noting “[t]hese flirtations
amounted to nothing”); Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The
Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 861, 866 (1999)
(describing Lambert and the Court’s decision in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), as
giving “rise to expectations that the Warren Court was prepared to read requirements of blame
and guilt into the Constitution,” expectations which were quickly dashed).
141. See Cynthia Alkon, The Lost Promise of Lambert v. California, 49 STETSON L. REV. 267,
278–79 (2020) (surveying federal and state cases where the defendant cited to Lambert, and
finding that the defendant only prevailed on their claims in 3.5 percent and 1.6 percent of the
cases, respectively).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609–10 (1971) (upholding a public welfare
offense regulating the sale of grenades).
143. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
144. Id. at 605. Though Staples focused on the interpretation of a federal statute and is thus
not binding authority in state courts, “its widespread use by state courts suggest[s] that [it] struck
a chord that is deeply fundamental to our criminal jurisprudence, even if not constitutional.”
Kennedy, supra note 51, at 121.
145. See United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 71–72 (1994) (reading mens rea into
a statute prohibiting the possession and distribution of child pornography); Ratzlaf v. United
States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994) (reading mens rea into a statute prohibiting the structuring of
cash transactions), superseded by statute, Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994 § 411, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a), (b), 5324(c) (1994)); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433–34
(1985) (reading mens rea into a statute regulating the sale of food stamps). Scholars suggest “[t]he
significance of these cases is difficult to overstate,” noting that, while not abolishing strict liability,
they “extended Morissette’s central concern with ruling out punishment without culpability to all
federal crimes, even public welfare offenses.” Stephen F. Smith, “Innocence” and the Guilty Mind,
69 HASTINGS L.J. 1609, 1623 (2018) (emphasis omitted).
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While Morissette and its progeny do not prohibit a legislature from
enacting a strict liability crime, they suggest that a legislature’s ability
to do so has constitutional limits.146 What exactly those limits are,
though, is less clear. The Court has so far declined to delineate a
constitutional border around strict liability offenses.147 However, it
appears that the ability of a legislature to remove mens rea from an
offense depends upon a two-part analysis. First, a court considers if the
statute qualifies as a public welfare offense, examining the severity of
the penalty imposed, the stigma likely to arise from a conviction, and
the type of conduct or item being regulated.148 If the items regulated
are inherently dangerous, then a sharper penalty can be imposed in the
absence of mens rea,149 though an item’s inherent danger “does not
necessarily suggest . . . that it is not also entirely innocent.”150 Second,
if the crime bears serious penalties, imposes severe stigma, and does
not regulate sufficiently dangerous items, then due process seems to
require that a mens rea element be read into the statute.151
Furthermore, if the crime has a deep common-law history, then a court
should strongly presume that the offense’s traditional mens rea
applies.152

146. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (“There is wide latitude in the
lawmakers to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its
definition . . . . On the other hand, due process places some limits on [the police power’s]
exercise.”); cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (stating that while a legislature
has the ability to define the elements of an offense, “there are obviously constitutional limits
beyond which the states may not go in this regard”).
147. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 618, 620 (“We need not adopt such a definitive rule of
construction . . . . [I]f Congress had intended to make outlaws of gun owners who were wholly
ignorant of the offending characteristics of their weapons . . . it would have spoken more clearly
to that effect.”).
148. Id. at 607, 616–18.
149. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (upholding a ten-year sentence under
a strict liability statute regulating the sale of grenades as justified in the “interest of public
safety”).
150. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 611 (distinguishing the gun at issue from the hand grenade in
Freed, stating “[e]ven [some] dangerous items can . . . be so commonplace and generally available
that we would not consider them to alert individuals to the likelihood of strict regulation”).
151. Id. at 611, 617–18. Notably, the Court read in a requirement of knowledge into each
statute, not just negligence or recklessness, thus implying that mens rea requirement “often
requires considerably more than minimal culpability.” Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea,
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 137 (2009) [hereinafter Smith, Proportional Mens Rea] (emphasis
omitted).
152. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (stating that “where Congress
borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed
word in the body of learning from which it was taken”).
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3. Felony Murder and Other Strict Liability Homicides. Further
complicating the issue is a long line of precedent upholding the
constitutionality of felony murder. Felony murder, though harshly
criticized as “an unsightly wart on the skin of the criminal law,”153 has
nonetheless remained a fixture in the American legal system.154 The
rule imposes liability for homicide based “on the culpability required
for the underlying felony,” not for any culpability toward the resulting
death.155 Like many DIH statutes, where liability for homicide attaches
from the act of delivering drugs, felony murder operates as a form of
strict liability. The MPC explains the rule as making sense only if one
considers mens rea as requiring “a general criminal disposition” rather
than a specific mental state toward each element of the offense.156
Felony murder is predicated on the concept that anyone who commits
a felony is a “bad person with a bad state of mind . . . [who] has caused
a bad result”; therefore, there should be no concern that the homicidal
result was far different or worse than the result the perpetrator actually
intended.157 As the theory goes, such crimes should be punished as
murders because the commission of the felony itself “expresses a
commitment to particularly reprehensible values.”158
Though Part III discusses how felony murder cannot coherently
justify DIH statutes, this Note will not fully outline the arguments for
and against felony murder, which have been extensively catalogued in
other works.159 Despite the vociferous critiques of felony murder,
153. H.L. Packer, Criminal Code Revision, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1973).
154. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.06(A), at 557 (4th ed. 2006).
Though felony murder was present at common law, it has since been abrogated in the United
Kingdom. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 448 n.12 (1985). Some states have abolished
felony murder via statute or judicial decree or have limited the doctrine in other ways. Id. at 446
nn.6–8. Recently, California amended their felony murder rule “to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who . . . did not act with the intent to kill.” Act of Sept. 30, 2018, ch.
1015, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1015 (West).
155. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 (AM. L. INST. 1962).
156. Id.
157. LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 1010.
158. See Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965,
967 (2008) [hereinafter Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder] (providing “the long-missing
principled defense of the felony murder doctrine”).
159. E.g., id. at 966 n.3. Professors Nelson Roth and Scott Sundby’s frequently cited critique
is particularly illuminating. See generally Roth & Sundby, supra note 154 (arguing that the felony
murder rule may violate due process and the Eighth Amendment). They argue, for instance, that
a prosecutor charging a defendant with homicide without a culpable mental state improperly
shifts the burden of proof from the prosecutor, creating a presumption of guilt rather than one of
innocence. Id. at 469–71.
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courts tend to defer heavily to the power of the legislature to create
these offenses, viewing the vitality of the felony murder rule as a
“strong indicat[ion] of states’ power to impose strict criminal
liability.”160 In this way, the felony murder rule self-perpetuates. Its
constitutionality is used to uphold strict liability offenses,161 which then
are used as evidence to support the validity of felony murder.
C. Mens Rea’s Semi-Constitutional Status
The continued presence of strict liability in criminal law conflicts
with the Supreme Court’s own pronouncement that “the existence of a
mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to the principles of
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.”162 Though repeatedly
recognizing mens rea as a fundamental principle of justice, the Court’s
“sanction[ed] . . . erosion” of that very principle through strict liability
and felony murder creates uncertainty.163 This lack of clarity
surrounding the doctrinal role of mens rea is exemplified by Professor
Herbert Packer’s famous quip: “Mens rea is an important requirement,
but it is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes.”164
It is important to note that the Morissette and Staples line of cases
primarily focused on statutory interpretation and did not take up any
direct constitutional questions. Yet, given the strong echoes of due
process in these opinions,165 one wonders if constitutional avoidance
played a large role.166 In each case, the Court was faced with multiple
plausible interpretations of a statute, including one interpretation that
could, by the Court’s own guidelines,167 be unconstitutional. Rather
than reaching the due process question or fully probing the limits to

160. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1171 (N.J. 1994); see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 568,
602 (1978) (“That States have authority . . . to enact felony-murder statutes is beyond
constitutional challenge.”).
161. See Maldonado, 645 A.2d at 1174 (relying on “the implicit validation of the felonymurder rule itself” to uphold a DIH statute).
162. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951).
163. Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 48, at 152.
164. Id. at 107 (emphasis omitted).
165. E.g., supra notes 116, 140, 144 and accompanying text.
166. The modern version of the avoidance canon dictates that if a plausible interpretation of
a statute raises “constitutional doubts,” the reviewing court must select a different interpretation,
thus avoiding the constitutional issue. Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and
as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1275, 1282 (2016). To clarify, “the court need not find that the
avoided reading is actually unconstitutional, the court must only find that there is a good chance
of it being unconstitutional.” Id.
167. Supra notes 134–35, 145 and accompanying text.

PHILLIPS IN PRINTER FINAL

2020]

FROM OVERDOSE TO CRIME SCENE

11/16/2020 7:39 PM

685

which these statutes could go, the Court simply sidestepped the issue
each time by reading mens rea into the statute.168 If these cases did rely
on the avoidance canon, even if only implicitly, it suggests they can be
considered quasi-constitutional rulings. Simply put, if there was no
interpretation to avoid that would deprive a defendant of due process,
there would be no plausible constitutional objections to these types of
statutes. Given this pattern of avoidance, the Court has not
persuasively justified its own position that strict liability is nearly
always constitutional. It has instead repeatedly signaled that there must
be some limit to strict liability crimes,169 perhaps dictated by a long
common-law tradition and the concept of due process.170
In the wake of these flirtations with a constitutional mens rea
requirement, scholars have struggled to articulate a cogent principle
that explains mens rea’s not quite, but almost, constitutional status.
Professor Joe Kennedy contends that mens rea was never fully
enshrined as a due process concern because the Court “was loath to
categorically rule that such ends could never justify the means,”171
instead granting legislatures wide latitude to criminalize offenses as
they thought necessary to protect the public welfare. But despite the
Court’s willingness to defer to legislative judgment, there remains a
consistent concern that laws “clearly designed for the very bad may end
up being successfully used against the possibly good.”172 Other scholars
take similar positions, positing that as the Court is no longer willing to
trust solely in the good faith of prosecutors,173 it instead selectively
requires mens rea as a way to protect innocents from criminal
liability.174
Though using different analytical frameworks, these scholars all
agree that the Court imposes a mens rea requirement when it is
concerned that the defendant in front of them is not sufficiently
blameworthy.175 Rather than elevating mens rea to constitutional
168. Supra note 145 and accompanying text. In one of these cases, the Court explicitly
engaged in constitutional avoidance, but did so to avoid reaching a First Amendment issue.
United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 69, 73 (1994).
169. Supra note 146 and accompanying text.
170. E.g., supra note 137 and accompanying text.
171. Kennedy, supra note 51, at 125.
172. Id.
173. John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal
Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (1999).
174. Singer & Husak, supra note 140, at 862.
175. This form of innocence protection manifests for Kennedy as a judicial preoccupation
with character. See Kennedy, supra note 51, at 86 (“Staples . . . seems to resonate most when

PHILLIPS IN PRINTER FINAL

686

11/16/2020 7:39 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:659

status, the Court uses it as a final safety valve to prevent punishing
those who society does not view as truly culpable. To justify the
existence of felony murder and the jurisprudence around strict liability
offenses, however, these scholars view the mens rea requirement as
only carving out a space for the completely innocent. If the offender is
engaging in inherently dangerous or criminal behavior, or if the
intentional conduct covered by the statute could be criminalized, then
the statute is constitutional.176
This distinction, while useful, does not fully explain the tension in
the doctrine. The Court’s own jurisprudence suggests the mens rea
requirement is tethered to more than just a desire to protect the
completely innocent. Rather, it also indicates a preoccupation with
proportional innocence. The Staples line of cases hints at a deeper
concern with accurately tailoring punishment to blame.177 In these
cases, the Court did not just read mens rea into each statute; it also
stated that the penalties were so severe as to require knowledge rather
than just recklessness or negligence,178 which are more traditionally
used as defaults in the absence of explicit mens rea requirements.179
Similarly, when determining what qualified as a permissible public
welfare offense, the Court analyzed both the severity of the
punishment and the dangerousness of the activity180—comparing the
proportionality of the sanction to the blameworthiness of the offense.

people of good character are prosecuted under statutes designed for the very bad.”). Professor
John Wiley frames the issue as a rule of mandatory culpability. Wiley, supra note 173, at 1022
(“This method of construction gives new form to an old and simple ideal: We do not convict
blameless people.”). Professor Alan Michaels reconciles this as a principle of constitutional
innocence. See Michaels, supra note 37, at 834 (stating that constitutional innocence means strict
liability offenses are only constitutional “when, but only when, the intentional conduct covered
by the statute could be made criminal by the legislature”).
176. See Kennedy, supra note 51, at 122 (“Staples will be used to read in additional mens rea
requirements only for those who are completely innocent, not simply partially innocent of some
additional crime or enhancement.” (emphasis added)); Michaels, supra note 37, at 879 (“Some
level of culpability is supplied by the actor’s choice to engage in the voluntary act covered by the
statute.”).
177. See Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 151, at 137 (“Proportionality, in short, has
been smuggled into the mens rea analysis . . . through the back door.”).
178. See Wiley, supra note 173, at 1112 (“The Court apparently has adopted the ‘knowledge’
standard as the default, rather than the option of ‘recklessness,’ or ‘negligence.’”).
179. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 5 (AM. L. INST. 1962); Dannye Holley, The Influence
of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost
Opportunities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229, 243–44
(1998) (detailing how the states that have adopted a default culpability have primarily chosen
either recklessness or negligence).
180. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616–18 (1994).
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Professor Stephen Smith helps explain this tension.181 Innocence
also exists, Smith argues, “when a prohibited act, though blameworthy,
is insufficiently blameworthy to deserve the penalties authorized by the
statute under which the offender is prosecuted.”182 Smith refers to this
as a “culpability gap”: the gap between the higher level of culpability
intended by the legislature and the lower level manifested in the
offender’s actions.183 The question is not just whether the offender
committed any criminal act. It is also whether that act makes them
“sufficiently culpable” to deserve the defined punishment.184
The culpability gap is further illuminated when applied to strict
liability homicide offenses—specifically, DIH laws. The Court has
explained that for a certain class of common-law crimes, particularly
homicide, “heightened culpability has been thought to merit special
attention.”185 The standard escalating structure of homicide offenses
correlates more culpable mental states with increasing levels of
punishment, creating a system of “proportional punishment for
blameworthy acts.”186 Strict liability DIH laws, then, do not harmonize
with homicide’s traditional structure of proportional punishment.
If one accepts the justifications for strict liability offenses, it seems
a legislature can criminalize any conduct without requiring mens rea as
long as the statute can rationally be said to protect public safety. The
only seeming outer boundary is the rule that criminal law “does not
offend fundamental notions of justice.”187 But imposing a lengthy
sentence and homicide liability on someone who lacked the intent to
kill seems intuitively to do just that. It is in light of this disconnect—
this culpability gap—that DIH statutes must be reexamined.

181. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 151, at 136.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 141 (emphasis omitted).
185. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980) (suggesting the distinction between
degrees of homicide, which ascribes higher levels of fault for higher levels of intent, implies that
certain crimes require a closer examination of culpability); see also Sayre, Mens Rea, supra note
103, at 995 (emphasizing the importance of culpability for “true crimes” such as homicide).
186. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 151, at 133–34.
187. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1174 (N.J. 1994); cf. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 210 (1977) (finding that “there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the [s]tates
may not go” in creating criminal offenses).
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III. MENS REA CONCERNS WITH DIH STATUTES
DIH statutes can perhaps be understood as either public welfare
offenses, ostensibly regulating dangers to the public, or as felony
murder analogs, imposing liability for accidental death during the
commission of a felony. Under either framing, these statutes raise
constitutional concerns. This Part first examines how DIH statutes fit
within the concept of a culpability gap, considering how past challenges
to these statutes support this view. It then looks at the specific concerns
with both the public welfare and felony murder constructions, using
New Jersey and Florida’s DIH statutes as examples.
A. DIH Statutes and the Culpability Gap
The majority of offenders prosecuted under these DIH laws do
not fit the model of “complete innocence.” Undeniably, most
defendants charged under these statutes are engaged in some form of
illegal conduct—possessing or distributing unlawful drugs. If one
accepts the views of Kennedy and others, the fact that these defendants
voluntarily engaged in any sort of illegal conduct makes DIH laws
presumptively constitutional.
But this view lacks context when applied to DIH statutes,
overlooking that, for many of the individuals prosecuted by these
laws,188 these are crimes caused by addiction. Rather than possessing
“a moral failing or character flaw,” these individuals suffer from a
chronic illness.189 Often an addict’s “behavior is driven by a compulsive
craving for the drug,” making drug use far less voluntary than criminal
policy suggests.190 Drug-war policies have long been predicated on the
stereotype that drug dealers are morally blameworthy individuals
choosing to take advantage of addicts.191 As our understanding of
188. Supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
189. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FACING ADDICTION IN AMERICA: THE
SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, AND HEALTH 2-1 (2016), https://
addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-generals-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V7EK-4F8Q] (“[S]evere substance use disorders . . . are now understood to be chronic illnesses
characterized by clinically significant impairments in health, social function, and voluntary control
over substance use.”).
190. Alan I. Leshner, Science-Based Views of Drug Addiction and Its Treatment, 282 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1314, 1314 (1999); see also id. (“While addiction traditionally has been thought of as
simply using a lot of drugs or as just physical dependence on a drug, advances in both science and
clinical practice have revealed that what matters most in addiction is often an uncontrollable
compulsion to seek and use drugs.”).
191. See, e.g., Neil, supra note 23, at 28 (discussing DIH as a tool to combat “drug dealers who
take advantage of those who have become addicted to opioids”).
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addiction evolves, however, this stereotype proves to be misleading.
Many of those who sell drugs are not stereotypical drug kingpins, but
addicts themselves.192 Drug sharing, or pooling money and sending one
person out to buy drugs for multiple people, is common.193 The
defendants prosecuted under these laws are guilty of some illegal
conduct, but are being punished for homicide—conduct of an entirely
different type and degree.194
Even accepting there are some individuals targeted under these
statutes that may fit a more traditional conception of culpability does
not alleviate this discomfort. It is possible to imagine the defendant the
legislature was targeting when enacting these statutes: an immoral drug
dealer peddling their wares with depraved indifference to any resulting
loss of life. Yet there is a tangible difference in blameworthiness
between an individual who knowingly distributes heroin tainted with
fentanyl,195 and a woman who gives her husband some of her legally
prescribed medication to help him sleep.196 As strict liability crimes,
DIH laws consider both individuals equally worthy of the same level of
punishment. A gap exists here “between legal and moral blaming,”197

192. See Kathryn Casteel, A Crackdown on Drug Dealers Is Also a Crackdown on Drug Users,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 5, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://53eig.ht/2JeBxCY [https://perma.cc/624ZKGTE] (“Brokers are almost always users who buy drugs from dealers for their friends or other
users and often get a cut of the heroin in exchange, which allows them to sustain their own
habits.”).
193. Meghan D. Morris, Anna Bates, Erin Andrew, Judith Hahn, Kimberly Page & Lisa
Maher, More Than Just Someone To Inject Drugs with: Injecting Within Primary Injection
Partnerships, 156 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 275, 275 (2015) (“Injection drug use is a
highly social activity. Drug procurement processes often necessitate resource pooling, and peer
networks provide an important resource for securing drugs and connecting with dealers.”).
194. See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
52 (2007) (“Unless persons are culpable for a state of affairs—at least negligent—no censure for
that state of affairs is deserved.”).
195. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of the U.S. Att’y, E. Dist. of North Carolina, Raleigh
Man Receives Concurrent Life Sentences for Heroin Overdose Death and Conspiracy (Apr. 29,
2020) [hereinafter U.S. Att’y E. Dist. of N.C. Press Release], https://www.justice.gov/usao-ednc/pr/
raleigh-man-receives-concurrent-life-sentences-heroin-overdose-death-and-conspiracy [https://
perma.cc/5VT2-6Y6Q]. Notably, the prosecutor discussed the defendant’s blameworthiness in mens
rea terms, stating he was “fully aware” of the danger of the drugs he was distributing, and “[h]e knew
that his customers were overdosing,” but showed “zero regard for [his] community.” Id. That
language suggests a mental state of recklessness or depraved indifference, a far higher level of mens
rea than the statute actually requires. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2018) (requiring no mens rea as
to the death resulting element).
196. Minnesota Woman Pleads Guilty in Methadone Death, CBS MINN. (Aug. 19, 2014, 6:18
AM), http://cbsloc.al/1rRVe3E [https://perma.cc/HX35-ELYR].
197. Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 269 (1987).
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one which becomes more discomfiting as the chasm between the moral
blameworthiness and the imposed punishment widens.
The culpability gap view explains why some past challenges to
DIH statutes have not raised due process concerns but instead raised
claims of cruel and unusual punishment.198 More frequently, challenges
to these statutes focused on other claims such as vagueness, lack of
notice, causal remoteness of the conduct to the death, or intervening
cause issues.199 Though many claims have been unsuccessful,200 some
convictions were overturned, often when there was insufficient
evidence to prove the defendant directly caused the death.201 These
cases can be seen as another attempt to close the culpability gap—
trying to more directly connect blameworthy conduct to the charged
crime.202 Though the few due process claims brought under these
statutes are usually quickly dispatched, 203 it is worth considering if a
DIH prosecution could create such a disconnect between culpability
and punishment that it would raise constitutional concerns.204

198. E.g., State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1175–77 (N.J. 1994).
199. LASALLE, supra note 4, at 9.
200. E.g., Jackson v. State, 292 So. 3d 1284, 1286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020); People v. Nere,
115 N.E.3d 205, 214–15 (Ill. 2018).
201. E.g., Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 219 (2014); People v. Coots, 968 N.E.2d
1151, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
202. See HUSAK, supra note 194, at 53 (“[T]ests of proximate causation often serve to mitigate
the harshness of doctrines in the criminal law that dispense with culpability—like the felony
murder rule . . . . They function[] as a surrogate for culpability.”).
203. See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 208 (granting certiorari on issues of causation and
foreseeability). Although petitioner argued that (1) the severity of the penalty placed the offense
outside the realm of acceptable public welfare offenses and (2) that the statute required mens rea
as to the resulting death to avoid violating due process, Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 26, 28–29,
Burrage, 571 U.S. 204 (No. 12-7515), the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction solely on
causation grounds, Burrage, 571 U.S. at 218–19. Other courts have also dismissed due process
challenges. See, e.g., Maldonado, 645 A.2d at 1170–73 (rejecting the defendant’s due process
argument by accepting the statute as a permissible public welfare offense, despite the severity of
the penalty).
204. A district court case suggests that there may be room for due process claims to be raised.
The Middle District of Florida, reviewing a conviction under the state possession statute discussed
infra Part III.C, cited Lambert and applied the tripartite Staples analysis to invalidate the statute
as facially violative of due process. Shelton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1300–
06 (M.D. Fla. 2011), rev’d, 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2012). The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
reasoning that the Supreme Court precedent did not provide clear due process holdings, and
deferred to the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute. Shelton, 691 F.3d at 1349.
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B. The Issues with a Public Welfare DIH Model
These due process concerns are even more apparent when treating
DIH statutes as public welfare offenses. Per the jurisprudence, a public
welfare offense should only be justified if the punishment is low, the
stigma is light, or if the conduct being regulated is inherently
dangerous.205 Through this lens, it is a struggle to justify DIH laws. This
Section considers how DIH laws fare under these factors, looking to a
specific state statute as an illustration.
1. Punishment, Stigma, and Danger. It is unclear exactly how much
punishment is permissible in the absence of mens rea. The Supreme
Court has rejected penalties of ten years’206 and three years’
imprisonment207 as too harsh, but has also upheld a penalty of five
years.208 Lower federal courts have taken an even stronger stance,
finding that two years’ imprisonment was unconstitutional.209 Although
it is difficult to draw a sharp line and declare that two, or three, or five
years may be consistent with due process, it is apparent that penalties
exceeding fifteen years raise serious constitutional concerns.210
In contrast, the majority of DIH laws far exceed any sentence
considered permissible under a traditional public welfare analysis,
imposing severe punishments ranging from ten years’ imprisonment to
the death penalty.211 These sentences, imposed in the absence of mens
rea, appear potentially “too severe to pass constitutional muster.”212
Additionally, DIH convictions impose indisputably heavy stigmas.
Nearly all jurisdictions classify these laws as felonies, often elevating

205. Supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.
206. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616–18 (1994).
207. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 442 n.18 (1978).
208. United States v. Balint, 58 U.S. 250, 254 (1922); supra note 128.
209. United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985). But see United States v.
Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431–35 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding a two-year conviction under the same
statute at issue in United States v. Wulff, but acknowledging “that the analysis takes place on a
very slippery slope”).
210. See United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1978) (stating that if Congress
attempted to create a strict liability crime that carried a penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment,
“the Constitution would be offended”); Shelton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289,
1301 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (“[T]he Court has not located[] any precedent applying federal law to
sustain a penalty of fifteen years, thirty years, and/or life imprisonment for a strict liability
offense.”), rev’d, 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2012).
211. Supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
212. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1302; see also id. (“Sentences of fifteen years, thirty years, and
life imprisonment are not by any measure ‘relatively small.’” (quoting Wulff, 758 F.2d at 1125)).
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them to the level of second- or first-degree murder.213 Labeling a
defendant as a felon causes “irreparable damage” to their reputation,
especially when combined with a “proclamation that [they are] so vile
[they] must be separated from society for . . . years.”214
DIH statutes’ presumptive constitutionality, then, depends on the
premise that those prosecuted under them are engaging in inherently
dangerous conduct and that these laws are rational measures taken to
ensure safety.215 This view takes into account the fact that “[d]rug
distribution puts the entire society at risk.”216 Undoubtedly, to some
degree, “drug crimes undermine the basic fabric of our social and legal
institutions,” and perhaps “none of these offenses can be fairly
characterized as victimless.”217 Even in the absence of an intent to
cause death, distributing and using drugs, at the very least, creates a
risk of harm. Thus, states arguably should have broad discretion to
impose whatever measures necessary to protect the public from
opioids, even if this may cause unfair or unjust results.218
Although this argument has merit, it lacks a limiting principle. A
vast range of conduct can conceivably be described as harmful to the
public. Intentional murder is harmful to public welfare, as is rape, or
burglary, or arson. All of these offenses are at least as morally
blameworthy as drug distribution, if not more so. Yet our criminal
system predominately requires a finding of specific intent in order to
impose criminal sanctions. Additionally, this argument overlooks the
futility and inefficacy of DIH laws, which do not successfully save lives,
deter drug use, or solve the very problems they purport to address.219
2. A Public Welfare Example: New Jersey. New Jersey’s DIH
statute is illustrative. New Jersey imposes first-degree strict liability for
any death resulting from the distribution of controlled substances,

213. Supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text; LASALLE, supra note 4, app. A.
214. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1302; see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 424 (1958) (“[A] criminal conviction carries with it an
ineradicable connotation of moral condemnation and personal guilt.”).
215. Supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
216. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1174 (N.J. 1994).
217. W. Cary Edwards, An Overview of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, 13
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 13, 17 (1989).
218. See Maldonado, 645 A.2d at 1172 (“[T]he conduct sought to be deterred—illegal drug
manufacture and drug distribution—is also widely regarded as constituting the most substantial
threat to public safety that now exists.”).
219. Infra Part IV.A.
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imposing a ten- to twenty-year term of imprisonment.220 Mens rea is
required for the distribution only.221 The statute’s placement in the
criminal code, listed under “Offenses Against Public Order, Health
and Decency,”222 suggests this DIH law was enacted as a regulatory,
public welfare offense. Given the severity of the criminal sanction,
however, New Jersey courts have instead analogized it to felony
murder.223
New Jersey courts are seemingly unbothered by this cognitive
dissonance. Finding that “whatever injustice results from strict liability
is more than counterbalanced by benefit to the public,” New Jersey
courts evaluating DIH charges have claimed that “the Constitution
places a lesser burden . . . to justify strict liability for serious criminal
offenses than for regulatory offenses.”224 Mens rea is not required
toward the resulting death, the courts claim, because “moral
culpability . . . is inextricably embedded in the drug death statute.”225
The penalty is too high and the associated stigma too great to
satisfactorily categorize New Jersey’s law as a valid public welfare
offense. Yet, New Jersey takes the logical justifications for public
welfare offenses—administrative convenience, easing the path to
prosecution by dispensing with proof of intent—and applies them to a
serious criminal offense, claiming that ultimately, the legislature’s
“rational conclusion that the safety of the public requires such
draconian measures is enough.”226 The law presumes that the mere act
of delivering drugs is sufficiently immoral and dangerous to justify
imposing the most severe form of liability for homicide. But given who
is actually being prosecuted under these laws and given how ineffective
DIH statutes are at protecting the public,227 New Jersey’s justifications
ring hollow.

220. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2016) (“Any person who manufactures, distributes or
dispenses . . . any . . . controlled dangerous substance . . . is strictly liable for a death which results
from the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that substance . . . .”); id. § 2C:43-6(1).
221. See Maldonado, 645 A.2d at 1170.
222. Chapter 35, “Controlled Dangerous Substances,” is located within Title 2C, Subtitle 2,
Part 5, entitled “Offenses Against Public Order, Health, and Decency.”
223. Maldonado, 645 A.2d at 1170 (“Criminal liability [here] . . . is similar to liability for
felony murder.”).
224. Id. at 1171–72 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 1174.
226. Id. at 1172.
227. Infra Part IV.A.
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C. Felony Murder and DIH Laws
If DIH statutes cannot be logically justified as public welfare
offenses, they might be better understood as felony murder analogs.
The
problems
with
felony
murder—already
“rationally
indefensible”228—are sharply apparent when examined in the DIH
context, particularly considering the extreme ends to which Florida has
gone.
1. Felony Murder and DIH Laws Are Conceptually Distinct.
Though the continued existence of felony murder implies that DIH
laws are valid, they are two fundamentally different concepts. Scholars
arguing for a principled interpretation of the felony murder rule
contend that it should be limited to inherently dangerous felonies such
as “[r]ape, robbery, arson, kidnapping, and murder (of a different
victim),” and should exclude drug distribution felonies, which impose
comparatively less risk and do so “with the apparent consent of the
victim.”229 Many states have, in fact, specifically limited their felony
228. Sanford H. Kadish, Supreme Court Review, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck
of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 681 (1994).
229. Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, supra note 158, at 1045–46. For purposes of
this Note, this Section limits its analysis to the felony murder conception articulated by Professors
David Crump and Guyora Binder, among others. Crump and Binder limit felony murder liability
to situations of moral desert, as “the rule’s most important purpose is enhancing the connection
between moral blameworthiness and the imposition of criminal liability.” David Crump,
Reconsidering the Felony Murder Rule in Light of Modern Criticisms: Doesn’t the Conclusion
Depend on the Particular Rule at Issue?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1155, 1161–62 (2009). Binder
argues that modern criticism of felony murder stems in part from a misconception of the rule “as
strict liability for accidental deaths occurring in the context of felonies,” when the historical
understanding of the rule was one that “deservedly imposed [liability], according to defensible
criteria of culpability.” Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 59, 186 (2004). In line with this concept, most states limit their felony murder rule, either
by restricting the rule to an enumerated list of violent or inherently dangerous predicate felonies,
or through judicial decisions that have narrowed the application of the doctrine. Roth & Sundby,
supra note 154, at 446 nn.6–8.
There are, however, states that have more expansive lists of predicate felonies, not limited
only to violent ones, and states that have no specific enumerated predicate felonies at all,
presumably imposing liability for death resulting during the commission of any felony. See John
O’Herron, Felony Murder Without a Felony Limitation: Predicate Felonies and Practical Concerns
in the States, 46 No. 4 CRIM. L. BULL. ART. 4 (2010) (documenting each state’s approach to felony
murder and predicate felonies). Some scholars have pointed out the innate issues with the more
expansive applications, arguing that “an application of the felony murder doctrine in the case of
an accidental death during a non-dangerous felony would result in elevating a harmless intent to
one of murder,” and noting that imposing liability in this way “ends up over-punishing the felon.”
Id. These expansive statutes might very well raise their own due process issues, particularly as the
modern era of overcriminalization has created felonies that were never considered at common
law. See HUSAK, supra note 194, at 40–41 (describing, among other new crimes, the creation of
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murder laws to those general categories.230 While felony murder
ostensibly punishes individuals for “callously impos[ing] risks of death
in order to achieve additional serious wrongs,”231 DIH laws
unavoidably target addicts, persons struggling with a “chronic,
relapsing disorder in which compulsive drug-seeking and drug-taking
behavior persists despite serious negative consequences.”232 While the
dangers of using drugs are undeniable, there is a tangible difference in
the moral blameworthiness of the classic examples of felony murder—
the bank robber who unintentionally shoots a clerk, the rapist who
unintentionally kills their victim mid-assault233—and the moral
blameworthiness of two addicts sharing heroin.
2. An Extreme Felony Murder Example: Florida. These tangible
differences become even more apparent when examining how far
Florida has stretched the doctrine. Florida’s DIH law is interpreted by
its courts as a form of felony murder, albeit an “unusual” version,234 as
the defendant does not need to intend that death result, have
knowledge of the overdose, or be present when the death occurs.235 If
a death results from the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance,
the distributor is liable for first-degree murder, subject to a mandatory
minimum sentence of life in prison, and potentially subject to the death
penalty.236
Complicating things, Florida has separately established that
distributing unlawful drugs does not require knowledge of the “illicit
nature of the controlled substance.”237 According to this construction,

new ancillary offenses that have “n[o] common-law analogues”). Though it is beyond the scope
of this Note, many of the arguments asserted here could also apply to these expansive felony
murder statutes.
230. See HUSAK, supra note 194, at 51 (noting that in “many states,” felony-murder rules are
“restricted to a small number of specifically enumerated felonies—robbery, sexual assault, arson,
burglary, kidnapping, or criminal escape”).
231. Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, supra note 158, at 966.
232. Jordi Camí & Magí Farré, Mechanisms of Disease: Drug Addiction, 349 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 975, 975 (2003).
233. Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, supra note 158, at 966.
234. E.g., Pena v. State, 829 So. 2d 289, 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). Florida defines firstdegree murder as either “premeditated,” as caused in the perpetration of an enumerated felony,
or as drug-induced homicide. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(1)–(3) (West 2017 & Supp. 2020).
235. Pena, 829 So. 2d at 294.
236. §§ 775.082(1)(a), 782.04(1)(a)(3).
237. Id. § 893.101(2)–(3); see State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 416 (Fla. 2012) (“The statute thus
expressly eliminates knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance as an element of
controlled substance offenses . . . . The statute does not eliminate the element of knowledge of
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a defendant could distribute a substance that they did not know was
heroin and then be liable for first-degree murder if a death resulted
from the ingestion of that heroin.238
Further complicating this DIH provision is the fact that Florida,
alone among all states, has an attempted felony murder provision.239
Setting aside the fundamental illogic of removing mens rea from the
crime of attempt,240 this allows prosecution for attempted DIH. Simply
put, if a person delivered drugs to another, without even knowing they
were drugs, and the other person experienced a non-fatal overdose, the
person who delivered the substance could be liable for attempted
felony murder. Though this charge does not yet appear to have been
brought in the DIH context, there is little stopping a prosecutor from
doing so.241

the presence of the substance . . . .”). A defendant can raise their lack of knowledge as an
affirmative defense to any relevant controlled substance offense. Id. § 893.101(2). However, if the
defendant raises this affirmative defense, the jury will be instructed that there is a “permissive
presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the substance.” § 893.101(3). Notably,
this shifts the burden of proof from the prosecutor to the defendant, requiring the defendant to
disprove this fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without
Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 710, 710 n.336 (2012) (stating that legislatures
can do this “by reclassifying elements closely associated with culpability, including mens rea, as
affirmative defenses,” and pointing out that Florida’s strict liability drug statute does exactly that).
238. Consider this hypothetical situation: Michael asks his friend, Charles, to do him a favor
and deliver a bag to his sister, Amy. Charles agrees and brings the bag to Amy; he looks inside
the bag on the way and sees a package containing a substance he does not recognize. The package
contains heroin, which Amy consumes, causing a fatal overdose. Despite no intent to harm Amy
or knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance, Charles has just committed felony DIH. It is
hard to imagine that this extreme application of Florida’s law would not be at least susceptible to
a due process challenge.
239. See State v. Sanders, 827 S.E.2d 214, 218 n.8 (W. Va. 2019) (“[O]nly the State of Florida
has codified the crime of attempted felony-murder . . . .” (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.051)).
Section 782.051 provides, in part: “Any person who perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate any
felony . . . and who commits, aids, or abets an intentional act that is not an essential element of
the felony and that could, but does not, cause the death of another commits a felony of the first
degree.”
240. See Amlotte v. State, 456 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. 1984) (Overton, J., dissenting) (pointing
out that this “create[s] a crime which necessitates the finding of an intent to commit a crime which
requires no proof of intent”), cited with approval in State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552, 553 (Fla. 1995)
(“[T]he crime of attempted felony murder is logically impossible.”), superseded by statute,
§ 782.051.
241. The attempted felony murder provision also requires the defendant “commit[], aid[], or
abet[] an intentional act that is not an essential element of the felony and that could, but does not,
cause the death of another.” § 782.051(2). To return to the previous hypothetical, supra note 238,
imagine that after Charles found the substance, he encouraged Amy to try it, and helped her
ingest it. Amy overdosed, but survived. Even if unwitting Charles did not know what the
substance was when he helped Amy consume it, he is now liable for attempted DIH, a first-degree
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These hypotheticals seem, and are, extreme. Current
jurisprudence, however, does not preclude them. Despite the
contrasting messages sent by an innocent-protecting Court, the body
of precedent functionally validating strict liability homicides makes it
unlikely that DIH statutes could be facially invalidated as
unconstitutional. But this dubious insulation from constitutional
attacks does not resolve or justify their inconsistencies with due
process. Resolving these issues, then, falls to the legislature.
IV. A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
A legislature currently has wide discretion to enact strict liability
DIH statutes; this does not mean that it should enact them. Even if one
agrees with the doctrinal precedent that there may be no mens rea
guarantee in the Constitution, this does not eliminate the possibility
that DIH laws are used in ways that are repugnant to our foundational
concepts of justice. Considering the structural protections our system
provides for the accused, these laws, while perhaps not
unconstitutional, can be considered anti-constitutional. In any event,
calling DIH laws constitutional is not the same as calling them just, or
even rational.
This Part examines the irrationality of DIH laws, positing that in
addition to the constitutional concerns they raise, these laws are
unnecessary and ineffective. It then proposes various ways that state
legislatures can attempt to mitigate the flawed policy and fundamental
injustice of these laws.
A. Policy Considerations
Unsurprisingly, many see DIH laws as an essential tool to mitigate
the overdose crisis, one justified by the extent of the crisis and the
moral blameworthiness of those involved.242 This justification,
however, would be more compelling if DIH laws were actually
effective in protecting the public welfare. Instead, they contravene
more recently enacted laws that better reflect current priorities and
societal values.

felony. If Charles truly had no knowledge of the type of substance, a conviction here also seems
like it could be a due process violation.
242. See Neil, supra note 23, at 28 (stating DIH statutes may not be a “silver bullet to the
public health crisis this nation faces,” but are a useful tool to focus on the “drug dealers who take
advantage of those who have become addicted to opioids”).
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1. DIH Statutes Are Not Life-Saving Measures. Contrary to the
premise that DIH laws are necessary to save lives, DIH laws are likely
to contravene life-saving initiatives and instead “aggravate the
problems they purport to address.”243 In the past few years, many states
and law enforcement departments have poured extensive resources
into harm-reduction initiatives, such as expanding access to naloxone
to prevent overdose deaths244 or enacting Good Samaritan laws to
provide limited criminal immunity for individuals reporting an
overdose.245
DIH laws are fundamentally at “cross-purposes with these
important efforts.”246 Some state prosecutors have even targeted the
use of these safety measures, treating signs of naloxone use at an
overdose scene as evidence that a homicide may have occurred.247
Rather than saving lives, stigmatizing drug addicts as murderers makes
it less likely that they will come forward for treatment, rehabilitation,
or life-saving assistance. Additionally, the majority of Good Samaritan
laws only offer protection from lower possession offenses, not other
charges such as DIH.248 Studies have shown that “overdose bystanders
are known to delay or refrain from calling 911” due to “[f]ear of police
involvement” and that most drug users, and many law enforcement
officers, are not even aware that these Good Samaritan laws exist.249
Conversely, DIH prosecutions are widely publicized.250 The
243. Brief of the Committee for Public Counsel Services and the Health in Justice Action Lab
at Northeastern University School of Law, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Defendant at 34,
Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 131 N.E.3d 812 (2019) (No. SJC-12617) [hereinafter Carrillo Amicus
Brief].
244. Drug Overdose Immunity and Good Samaritan Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(June 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/drug-overdose-immunitygood-samaritan-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/F854-MRYY].
245. Good Samaritan Overdose Prevention Laws, PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE POL’Y SYS.,
http://pdaps.org/datasets/good-samaritan-overdose-laws-1501695153 [https://perma.cc/JAD2WMXP] (reporting laws valid at least through July 1, 2018).
246. Carrillo Amicus Brief, supra note 243, at 34.
247. See Daugherty & Stachula, supra note 83, at 31 (“Look for evidence of [Naloxone] use
at the crime scene. This may be evidence that your victim was with someone prior to their
death.”).
248. DRUG POL’Y ALL., 911 GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS: PREVENTING OVERDOSE DEATHS,
SAVING LIVES 1 (Feb. 2016), https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA_Fact%20Sheet
_911%20Good%20Samaritan%20Laws_%28Feb.%202016%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GHG69VV].
249. Amanda D. Latimore & Rachel S. Bergstein, “Caught with a Body” Yet Protected by
Law? Calling 911 for Opioid Overdose in the Context of the Good Samaritan Law, 50 INT’L J.
DRUG POL’Y 82, 82 (2017).
250. Supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
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increasingly publicized use of DIH laws may cause drug users to use
alone or deter people from seeking help in an emergency, increasing
their risk of death from overdose.251
2. DIH Statutes Do Not Effectively Incapacitate or Deter. Nor do
these laws effectively mitigate the opioid crisis. DIH laws tend to only
imprison low-level dealers or users, not larger drug suppliers.252 Some
lawmakers argue that imprisoning lower-level users may successfully
work to dismantle large supply chains, as “drug kingpins could not
operate profitably absent a steady demand for controlled dangerous
substances.”253 History has shown, however, that incarcerating lowerlevel users does nothing to stop the actual supply of opioids from
continuing to flow to those who want them.254 DIH laws thus attempt
to reduce supply but do nothing to address the problem of demand.
Additionally, these laws are not likely to deter drug use. In theory,
the existence of these DIH laws may not only deter people from
distributing drugs, but might also “keep[] a relatively large class of
persons from engaging in certain kinds of activity,” such as using drugs,
in the first place.255 However, not only is it debatable exactly how much
of a deterrent effect these laws may have on someone who is dedicated
to criminal drug trafficking,256 but these arguments also overlook that
a defining feature of addiction is “compulsive drug seeking and use,”
notwithstanding “well-known and severe negative consequences.”257 In
251. See Travis Lupick, If They Die of an Overdose, Drug Users Have a Last Request, YES!
MAG. (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.yesmagazine.org/democracy/2018/08/31/if-they-die-of-anoverdose-drug-users-have-a-last-request [https://perma.cc/LH9M-HTE2] (“In public health
messaging, the first thing that’s said is, ‘Don’t use alone.’ . . . But in this context, it can mean that
if I go and score some drugs, and then I share those drugs with you . . . that relationship is targeted
in prosecutions.” (quoting Leo Beletsky)).
252. See LASALLE, supra note 4, at 42 (stating that due to the requirement of proving
causation, “charges become more difficult the higher up the distribution chain one goes”).
253. Edwards, supra note 217, at 13; see also id. at 14 (“[A]n appropriately stern sanction must
be imposed upon drug users, without whom the dealers and profiteers would have neither a
market nor a reason to exist.”).
254. See Beletsky, supra note 55, at 849 (“By narrowly defining the ‘opioid epidemic’ as a
purely supply-driven phenomenon, decision-makers overlooked proven prevention and response
tools. These missteps led the crisis to morph from bad to worse.” (footnote omitted)).
255. Wasserstrom, supra note 42, at 736–37.
256. See Grady, supra note 85 (quoting Waukesha County District Attorney Sue Opper: “I
would say the drug dealers don’t care (because) they’re motivated by greed;” and Milwaukee
County District Attorney John Chishom: “The deterrence in and of itself does not change the
behavior as long as the incentive is too great”).
257. Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278 SCI. 45, 45 (1997); see
also Carrillo Amicus Brief, supra note 243, at 45 (“[T]hese prosecutions lack a deterrent effect,
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fact, no empirical evidence supports that harsher enforcement has any
correlation to a reduction in drug activity,258 and further, there is reason
to suspect that “drug enforcement activities actually lead to increases
in violent crime.”259
For proponents of DIH laws, sacrificing mens rea requirements
and historical notions of fairness may be a necessary sacrifice for the
public good. But considering these laws have limited deterrent effect,
do not reduce the rate of overdose deaths, and contravene other
legislative initiatives enacted to protect the public, justifying their
utility is difficult. Perhaps the only valid rationale for DIH laws is
retributive—to punish those whose actions, however indirectly, lead to
death. When applied to the Jarret McCaslands of the world, this seems
like nothing more than punishing an addict for the fact of their
addiction.260
B. Legislative Solutions
As discussed above, though there are serious due process concerns
with DIH laws, it would be difficult to effectively challenge them in
court. If any change to these DIH statutes is to occur, it must be part
of a legislative initiative. Rather than relying on retributive impulses
particularly against people suffering from addiction. There is a broad consensus among scholars
and policy analysts that the threat of legal sanction does not deter drug dealing or drug use, even
when the threatened punishments are increased.”).
258. Daniel Stein, Pew Analysis Finds No Relationship Between Drug Imprisonment and Drug
Problems, PEW TRS. (June 19, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
speeches-and-testimony/2017/06/pew-analysis-finds-no-relationship-between-drugimprisonment-and-drug-problems [https://perma.cc/V48Q-MB3L].
259. Carrillo Amicus Brief, supra note 243, at 47 (emphasis added); see also id. (“So long as
demand for illegal drugs exists, attempts to constrict the drug supply by incarcerating traffickers
will continue to lead to the ‘replacement effect,’ whereby individuals or organizations quickly fill
the void created by enforcement activities.”).
260. Jarret’s case is illustrative. It was not clear what Flavia’s exact cause of death was, nor
who, if anyone, had given her the heroin. Supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. It was only
clear that she was using while with Jarret, a fellow addict—a circumstance apparently sufficient
to sentence him to life in prison without parole. Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
As previously discussed, prosecutors have used DIH laws broadly, often charging a person,
usually a fellow addict, who happened to be with the victim when they died. Supra notes 32–33
and accompanying text. Though to the Author’s knowledge no one has directly challenged these
laws as status crimes, it is important to remember that the Supreme Court has declared that
criminalizing addiction is unconstitutional. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)
(stating that “narcotic addiction is an illness” and holding “that a state law which imprisons a
person thus afflicted as a criminal . . . inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment”). In the wake of increased DIH prosecutions, some have suggested that
it is worth exploring litigation that “reviv[es] this line of constitutional argument.” Beletsky, supra
note 55, at 856–58.
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and ineffective drug-war policies, state legislatures should look at
alternate ways to prevent overdose deaths without sacrificing
fundamental criminal justice principles.261 This Section outlines three
ways a legislature could resolve the due process issues DIH laws
implicate.
1. Repeal DIH Statutes. As DIH laws contravene their own
purpose, fail to mitigate the opioid crisis, and run counter to our
foundations of criminal justice, the most principled legislative response
is to repeal them entirely. The tide of criminal justice is slowly moving
toward reform, and DIH laws should be no exception. Legislatures can
and should invalidate these strict liability homicides as inconsistent
with the basic principles of our criminal justice system.
States may resist repealing these laws, clinging to the justifications
outlined above. For the truly culpable, however, alternatives are
available. States with DIH laws also have extensive drug possession
and trafficking offenses that more directly target the actual socially
harmful conduct that is occurring.262 In the most extreme
circumstances, states can still attempt to prosecute overdose deaths as
negligent or reckless homicides,263 theories of liability that necessarily
require the state to prove the mental state and culpability of the
individual to achieve a conviction.
2. Include a Higher Mens Rea Component. Similarly, if legislatures
are unwilling to fully repeal DIH statutes, they can amend them to
better align with due process principles. For one, legislatures could
severely reduce the homicide liability and penalty, transforming them
into more classic representations of public welfare offenses. This
approach would remove the homicide classification entirely,

261. These proposed solutions are primarily aimed at state legislatures. Although there is a
federal DIH law in the form of a “death results” provision in the CSA, the current stall on
legislative activity emerging from the federal government makes it unlikely that Congress would
be the first mover on amending any such legislation. See Carl Hulse, Amid Rancor in House, It’s
Quiet in the Halls of the Senate. Too Quiet., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2OXC2X0
[https://perma.cc/RC7X-9VPC] (discussing descriptions of the current U.S. Senate as a
“legislative graveyard”).
262. For example, a defendant who recently received a life sentence for DIH also received a
concurrent life sentence for Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with the Intent to Distribute,
thirty years for Possession with the Intent to Distribute a Quantity of Heroin, and ten years for
Possession of a Firearm by a Felon. U.S. Att’y E. Dist. of N.C. Press Release, supra note 195.
263. Neil, supra note 23, at 27.
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categorizing them instead as minor criminal offenses imposing a fine
but no prison term.
Alternatively, these statutes could retain their homicide
classifications but require a mens rea element of criminal negligence or
recklessness toward the resulting death. Under a recklessness standard,
there would not be a “per se rule that the distribution of heroin alone,
without more, suffices to support a verdict;” instead, the law would
require a fact-specific inquiry into each case to determine if the
defendant’s conduct created a “high degree of likelihood that
substantial harm [would] result.”264 Treating drug-overdose offenses in
this way, closer to how some states treat vehicular manslaughter,265
would offer a path to prosecution for the truly culpable offender while
mitigating many due process concerns currently implicated by DIH
statutes.
3. Specifically Target Large-Scale Distributors. A final approach
is to amend DIH statutes in a way that specifically addresses the type
of conduct these laws purport to address—namely, large-scale drug
dealing. DIH statutes could be amended for use only when certain
aggravating factors were present, such as “if the victim were an
unwitting user of the illegal substance; if there were multiple deaths
involved with one batch of drugs [or] if the dealer were a high-level
distributor.”266 States could modify the drug-distribution element of
the offense, requiring that a large amount of the drug be distributed
before DIH liability attaches.
In theory, some of the policy concerns about the way these laws
are prosecuted could be alleviated by focusing on upper-level
traffickers rather than charging fellow addicts sharing drugs. Some
states have already begun taking this approach. In response to

264. Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 131 N.E.3d 812, 819, 826, 828 n.10 (Mass. 2019); see id. at
825–26 (detailing various factors to consider, such as if the defendant knew the heroin was laced
with fentanyl, if the defendant personally injected the deceased, or if the defendant observed the
victim overdose and failed to call for help).
265. For example, New Jersey imposes strict liability on any death resulting from intoxicated
operation of a vehicle as a third-degree crime. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5.3 (West Supp. 2019).
The crime can be elevated to second-degree homicide only if the driver was found to be reckless.
Id. § 2C:11-5. Notably, the strict liability version still carries a minimum prison term of between
three and five years, id., still far above the traditional public welfare offense level.
266. John H. Tucker, Angela Halliday Was a Junkie. Does that Make Her a Murderer?,
RIVERFRONT TIMES (Aug. 4, 2011) http://www.riverfronttimes.com/2011-08-04/news/angelahalliday-heroin-overdose-drug-induced-homicide-ben-berkenbile [https://perma.cc/FEJ5-CMUZ]
(reporting the positions of U.S. Attorney for Eastern Missouri Richard Callahan).
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criticisms, Mississippi recently modified a proposed DIH law to require
that the defendant be charged with the transfer of at least two grams of
opioids in order to be liable for DIH.267 Similarly, Delaware’s current
statute requires the underlying drug deal to involve at least five grams
in order to be liable for the homicide charge.268
These modifications, however, would do little to mitigate the
overall concerns with these laws. These statutes are not likely to deter
illicit conduct or to reduce the demand for opioids. Nor do these
modifications mitigate the ultimate due process issues. Regardless of
the volume of drugs required to prosecute someone under a DIH law,
these statutes still impose homicide liability without any requisite proof
of mens rea. Thus, they remain anathema to foundational concepts of
justice.
CONCLUSION
Jarret McCasland will likely remain in prison for the rest of his
life. In June 2019, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his application
to reconsider his untimely appeal—the appeal, filed in May 2017, was
received three minutes late.269 It is possible that the court, which said it
would have heard the case on the merits were it timely filed,270 would
have concluded that Jarret was denied due process, that sentencing him
to life in prison for a crime he did not intend to commit was an
egregious miscarriage of justice. It is possible, but unlikely. Relief for
Jarret and others like him will likely not come from the courts. Without
strong action from legislatures, DIH statutes will remain in effect and
will, if the current trend continues, be utilized with increasing fervor.
The Constitution may not explicitly guarantee a mens rea
requirement to preserve due process, but the history of our
jurisprudence demonstrates that for some crimes, narrowing the gap
between culpability and punishment is imperative to achieve a just
result. Imposing the most severe sanction the law allows and depriving
267. Michelle Liu, “Parker’s Law” Would Put Drug Dealers Behind Bars for Overdose
Deaths, MISS. TODAY (Feb. 4, 2019), https://mississippitoday.org/2019/02/04/parkers-law-wouldcharge-dealers-friends-for-drug-overdose-deaths [https://perma.cc/85QA-7SJQ].
268. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4752B (2017); id. § 4751C (LEXIS through 82 Del. Laws, ch.
281).
269. Joe Gyan Jr., In Unique Murder Case, Louisiana Court Won’t Hear Denham Springs
Man’s Untimely Appeal, ADVOCATE (June 17, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/
baton_rouge/news/courts/article_2e239c5a-9145-11e9-945b-0bdf87c1dc81.html [https://perma.cc/
67FD-SKQD]. Jarret’s appellate attorney “blamed the late filing on a computer glitch.” Id.
270. Id.
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an individual of liberty requires care and deliberation, not a mechanical
finding of guilt based on unfortunate circumstances. Removing a mens
rea requirement for homicide liability removes the anchor of fairness
from our criminal justice system. It has been debated whether the
allowance of strict liability crimes is compatible with what the accepted
values of society are, or whether the allowance of these crimes is
incompatible with what accepted values should be.271 This Note asserts
that DIH laws do not accord with our societal values, and calls on
legislatures to repeal them before more damage is done.

271. Wasserstrom, supra note 42, at 741.

